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Between Convictions and
Reconciliations: Processing Criminal
Cases in Kazakhstani Courts
Alexei Trochev†
The criminal justice system in Kazakhstan is full of contradictions:
Soviet-era accusatorial bias in pre-trial detention and sentencing goes hand in
hand with the pro-defendant bias in closing criminal cases. This paradoxical
co-existence of seemingly contradictory biases fits well within the informal
power map of the criminal justice system. The major reform—reducing
prison population to decrease recidivism and minimize international
shaming—was coupled with the more recent drives for closing cases on the
basis of reconciliation, the total registration of crimes, and zero tolerance
approach to combating crime have been achieved only through the change of
the incentive structure in the criminal justice system. The post-Soviet
innovation of closing criminal cases of public prosecution based on the
reconciliation with the victim of crime has proliferated in Kazakhstan because
this matched both the incentives of the key actors in the criminal justice
system and demands from private actors who are involved in criminal
proceedings. In contrast, other types of public participation, such as jury
trials, which implement the right to a fair trial, give teeth to adversarial
proceedings, and cultivate judicial independence—requirements of the
Constitution of Kazakhstan—have rarely been used because they disrupt
existing power relationships within the law-enforcement system.
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Introduction
How and why do some legal reforms take root while others fail? This is
an important question for legal scholars, social scientists, and policy-makers
given the recent proliferation of interest in achieving good governance
through law supported by international organizations and implemented by the
burgeoning rule-of-law industry at the expense of the Western taxpayers. 1
This Article argues that the success of legal reforms is crucial to the existing
power map within the legal system—law-enforcement agencies, including
courts, formal and informal relationships among and within these agencies,
and the incentives and traditions that shape these relationships. More
specifically, it examines the continuity and change in how Kazakhstan’s
criminal justice system has been processing criminal cases in the past twentyfive years since its independence in late-1991. Kazakhstan’s criminal justice
reforms have not been seriously studied. Like many other non-democratic
regimes, the country’s criminal justice system has been known for its lack of
judicial independence, torture cover-ups, politicized criminal trials of
political opponents, rogue government officials and journalists, and judicial
corruption. 2 Yet these cases, while visible, only constitute a tiny share of all
criminal cases. 3 The bigger picture shows that Kazakhstan has drastically
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1. LINN A. HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING DONOR
ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 210–11 (2014); RACHEL
KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION REFORM 26, 27
(2012); UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 4
(2008); Vera Axyonova, Promoting Justice Reforms in Central Asia: The European
Union’s Rule of Law Initiative as Part of a Comprehensive Democratization
Strategy?, CEN. ASIAN AFFAIRS 3, 29–48 (2016); Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law
Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 4
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2010).
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW
INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR KAZAKHSTAN 2
(Feb. 2004), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/kazakhstan/kazahstan-jri2004.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/474N-GBHB]; Maksat Kachkeev, Judicial
Independence in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan: A Legislative Overview, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 1255, 1268 (Anja Seibert-Fohr et al. eds., 2012); Daniyar
Kanafin, Criminal Justice Reform in Kazakhstan and OSCE Commitments, 20 SECURITY
& HUM. RTS. 56, 57 (2009); see MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED
PROMISE? 214, 218 (2010); Cynthia Alkon, The Increased Use of “Reconciliation” in
Criminal Cases in Central Asia: A Sign of Restorative Justice, Reform or Cause for
Concern?, 8 PEPP. DIS. RESOL. L.J. 41, 58–59 (2007–2008); Kyle W. Davis, Purging the
System: Recent Judicial Reforms in Kazakhstan, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 255,
269–70 (2002); Marina Shin et al., Implementation of Judicial Independence in Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan in the Rule of Law Context, 46 MANAGERIAL L. 86, 90–94 (2004); Gulnar
Suleimenova, Sudebnaia Reforma v Respublike Kazakhstan: Obzor Osnovnykh Etapov
[Judicial Reform in the Republic of Kazakhstan: A Review of Main Phases], ZAKON
(2010), https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38412079 [https://perma.cc/6FBC3HTF]; Iskander Tugelbaev, Kazakhstan Slammed Over Torture Claims, TRANSITIONS
ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2016) http://www.tol.org/client/article/25656-kazakhstan-slammedover-torture-claims.html [https://perma.cc/6RLQ-ER33].
3. E.g., Bakhyt Nurgaliyev et al., Police Corruption in Kazakhstan: The Preliminary
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reduced its prison population without using amnesties, while enforcing total
registration of crimes and practicing zero-tolerance policing. 4 It has
abolished the Soviet-era supervisory review of final court judgments and
return of criminal cases for supplementary investigation, which gave an
unfair advantage to the prosecution. It has no overcrowded jails and is closing
down empty ones due to the lack of detainees. It has also introduced
probation, including pre-trial probation, for the first time in Central Asia.5 Its
judges and prosecutors have many more closed cases than cases resulting in
indictment and conviction, and thus, appear to have exercised a great deal of
discretion. 6 Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian country that has
functioning trials by mixed juries—ten lay judges and one professional
judge—which have been producing an unusually high proportion of
acquittals in the past decade. 7 Finally, according to the World Justice Project
and World Economic Forum, Kazakhstan’s judiciary rankings have been
gradually improving. 8 According to the business confidence survey,
Kazakhstani businesses report higher confidence in courts—a stark contrast
to a public that largely distrusts the judiciary. 9 This Article suggests that
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Results of the Study, 7 REV. EUR. STUD. 140, 142 (2015). On average, since 2013, there
are 360,000 criminal cases registered annually. Official crime statistics are available at
the official website of the Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts (CLS) of
the General Procuracy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT
STATISTICS], http://service.pravstat.kz/portal/page/portal/POPageGroup/Services/Pravstat
[https://perma.cc/X372-YJ9N] (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
4. See Kazakhstan, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://prisonstudies.org/country/
kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/5HNV-RHVL] (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); Baubek
Konyrov, Kazakhstan President Calls to Zero Tolerance for Crime, TENGRI NEWS, https:/
/en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-President-calls-to-zero-tolerance-for-crime22298/ [https://perma.cc/2ULT-DV5H] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
5. Talgat Isenov, This Year Kazakhstan Closes 7 Prisons, KAZAKHSTANSKAIA
PRAVDA (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/society/this-year-kazakhstan
-closes-7-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/FR7N-S79U]; Kazakhstan to Close Prisons, B NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://bnews.kz/en/news/obshchestvo/kazakhstan_closing_its_prisons2016_08_19-1286879 [https://perma.cc/X2F8-WMEM]; Dmitry Lee, Kazakhstan
Significantly Reduces Prison Population, ASTANA TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), http://astana
times.com/2016/11/kazakhstan-significantly-reduces-prison-population[https://perma.cc/
MB4E-33FH]. On probation, see EUROPEAN UNION PROJECT: ENHANCING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN KAZAKHSTAN, DEVELOPMENT OF PROBATION IN KAZAKHSTAN, https://
www.eucj.kz/application/files/3014/7546/5284/Development_of_the_probation_in_
Kazakhstan_ENG_RU.pdf [https://perma.cc/99TL-TNA8] (last visited May 30, 2017);
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, CIS LEGISLATION (Dec. 30, 2016), http://cislegislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=92581 [https://perma.cc/CGY9-77SK].
6. See Alkon, supra note 2, at 84–85.
7. See NIKOLAI KOVALEV, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE
FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION 231 (Edwin Mellen Press 2010); John D.
Jackson & Nikolai Kovalev, Lay Adjudication in Europe: The Rise and Fall of the
Traditional Jury, 6 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 368, 376 (2016).
8. See KLAUS SCHWAB, The GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2016–2017, WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM 223
(2016),
http://www.nmi.is/media/338436/the_global_
competitiveness_report_2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8THA-X9FG]; WORLD JUSTICE
PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX (2016), http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/
media/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EU7-NP5Z].
9. Among All State Bodies the Kazakhstan People Mostly Trust President and His
Administration, DEMOSCOPE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.demos.kz/eng/index.php?
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while maintaining a low level of repression, Kazakhstan’s criminal justice
reforms have expanded the participation of private actors in criminal justice
proceedings to the extent that the participation does not disrupt the existing
amicable relations among detectives, investigators, state prosecutors, and
judges. Part I lays out Kazakhstan’s changing terrain of law-enforcement
agencies and courts, relationships among and between them, and incentives
and traditional modes of interactions within the criminal justice system. Part
II examines how this structure of incentives and mutually-reinforcing
informal relationships result in a remarkable continuity of pre-trial detentions,
indicating the failure in introducing the adversarial proceedings at the pretrial stage through the judges’ powers to detain. Part III explores how these
informal relationships and incentives help the Soviet-era avoidance of
acquittals persist in handling grave criminal cases of public prosecution, in
contrast to cases of private prosecution and those decided by jury trials. Part
IV explains that the change in incentives, without disrupting cooperation
among law-enforcement agents and judges, results in the skyrocketing of less
serious criminal cases closed on the basis of reconciliation between the
defendant and the victim of crime.
In sum, private persons are allowed to participate in processing criminal
cases in three ways. First, individuals may file cases of private prosecution
like libel and battery, in which judges show no accusatorial bias and acquit
more often than convict. Second, victims of minor- and medium-gravity
crimes are permitted to reconcile with defendants, often with encouragement
or pressure from law-enforcement officials. Third, lay judges may take part
in jury trials of the defendants charged with grave crimes, but the criminal
justice system resists jury trials and tends to convict in single-judge trials. To
understand these differing dynamics, one must first understand how this
participation improves or disrupts the existing power relations within the
criminal justice system.
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article=10. But see Life in Kazakstan, IPSOS-MORI, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default
/files/migrations/en-uk/files/Assets/Docs/Polls/life-in-kazakhstan-tables-2015.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/64AZ-EVLX] (last visited May 18, 2017) (referencing pages 14, 41, 43, 62, 88,
and 90 of downloadable PDF).
10. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Post-Soviet Criminal Justice: The Persistence of Distorted
Neo-Inquisitorialism, 19 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 159, 159 (2015).
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I. Mapping the Criminal Justice System in Kazakhstan: Legacies,
Incentives, Practices, and Outputs
What if someone fell asleep in a courtroom of the Kazakh Soviet
Socialist Republic in the late 1980s and suddenly woke up today, in a
courtroom of an independent Kazakhstan? Would she notice any continuity?
The answer is, yes and no. On the one hand, Kazakhstani judges would
behave in some very familiar ways. In addition to keeping trials quick,
boring, and strictly-controlled, judges would also be systematically biased in
favor of the state prosecution in the criminal justice system. 10 Similar to the
period of “developed socialism,” the first twenty years of post-Soviet
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12. Alexei Trochev, How Judges Arrest and Acquit: Soviet Legacies in
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Postcommunist Criminal Justice, in HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA AND
EASTERN EUROPE 152, 152–53 (Mark Beissinger & Steven Kotkin eds., 2014).
13. See infra Table 2.
14. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
15. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [UK RK] [Criminal Code] art. 67
(1997) (Kaz.), translated in http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/K970000167_ [https://perma.
cc/DH5V-LA98] [hereinafter Criminal Code (1997)].
16. See infra Table 8.
17. V Proshlom Gody v Uzbekistane Bylo Rassmotreno Okolo 62 Tys. Ugolovnykh
Del [About 62 Thousand Criminal Cases Have Been Heard in Uzbekistan Last Year],
PODROBNOSTI (Feb. 7, 2017), http://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/v-proshlom-godu-vuzbekistane-bylo-rassmotreno-okolo-62-tys-ugolovnykh-del-/ [https://perma.cc/WBZ7Z299].
18. Official Statistics on the Number of Defendants in Criminal Cases Closed in NonExonerating Grounds, EMISS, https://fedstat.ru/indicator/41837 [https://perma.cc/MY39FPH9] (last visited May 30, 2017). Criminal cases closed on the basis of reconciliation
constitute about 80% of all closed cases.
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Kazakhstan demonstrate that judges consistently show Soviet-era
“accusatory bias,” and side with the state prosecution in both pre-trial and
trial stages of criminal proceedings. 11 Though there has been an increase in
judicial discretion and an introduction of some adversarial features in court
proceedings, post-communist judges continue to strengthen two late socialist
legacies of criminal justice systems: near universal approval of pre-trial
detention of the accused, and avoidance of acquittals. 12 Judges in Kazakhstan
have the newly-acquired exclusive power to release the accused, yet they
consistently approve 95% detention requests and nearly all requests for
extension of detention proposed by state prosecutors. 13 It is extremely rare
for judges to acquit defendants in criminal trials of public prosecution (with
no higher than a 1% rate of acquittal)—much like socialist-era judges did in
the 1980s when they acquitted about 1% of defendants.14
On the other hand, Kazakhstani judges and, most recently, police
investigators and state prosecutors, behave very differently when processing
less-serious crimes. Instead of proving the guilt of the accused, sending cases
to trial and convicting, these law-enforcement officials are busy closing
criminal cases due to reconciliation between the defendants and victims of
crimes. Soviet-era criminal codes did not allow closing criminal cases of
public prosecution on this basis. 15 But in 2013, Kazakhstani state prosecutors
closed some 40,000 cases, or one out of every three criminal cases, on the
basis of reconciliation, while judges managed to reconcile the accused and
the victim in four out of every ten tried cases. 16 These numbers, and the
proportion of reconciled cases to unreconciled cases, are much higher than in
other post-Soviet states. In 2016, Uzbekistani courts heard some 62,000
criminal cases against 84,118 defendants, acquitted not a single person, and
closed a record high number of cases against 14,811 defendants (18%) on the
basis of reconciliation with the victim. 17 In Russia, with its two million
annually registered criminal cases, prosecutors and judges closed cases
against 2,100 defendants on average every year between 2011 and 2015. 18 In
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Belarus, closing criminal cases on the basis of reconciliation has been
increasingly unpopular. The trend is the opposite of Kazakhstan: Belarusian
judges closed, on the basis of reconciliation, a total of 2,703 criminal cases in
2011, 1,755 in 2012, 1,193 in 2013, and 479 cases in the first six months of
2014. 19 Meanwhile, Belarusian investigators and prosecutors closed a total
of 523 criminal cases against 704 accused persons in the first ten months of
2014. 20
Why do Kazakhstani judges almost always rule in favor of the state
prosecution in criminal cases the same way they did under late socialism,
while, at the same time, encourage private actors to reach reconciliation and
avoid being sentenced in the context of authoritarian political regime? More
broadly, how and why do some legal reforms take root while others fail?
By drawing on how Kazakhstan’s criminal justice system has processed
criminal cases since gaining independence in late 1991, this Article argues
that the answer to these questions lies in a mix of relationships based on the
Soviet legacy and post-communist incentives. Like they did in the 1980s,
judges today face a host of formal and informal pressures and expectations
which discourage both acquittals and denials of detention requests, yet
encourage quick handling of criminal cases. In Kazakhstan, these pressures
and expectations persist due to two types of Soviet legacies. The first type is
a Soviet legacy of simple fragmentation. Here, the old guard remains in
charge. 21 As President Nazarbayev admitted in March 2015, “[w]e need to
move away from the Soviet judicial system, and raise new judges.” 22 Indeed,
Kazakhstani courts have been renamed, and the word “socialist” no longer
precedes “legality,” but the essential task of judges in criminal cases remains
the same: to support the Procuracy—the chief law-enforcement institution of
the Soviet state. 23 This type of legacy is formally entrenched in the legal
framework of criminal proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Code, 24 and
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19. Will Criminals Be Allowed to Amicably Negotiate with the Victims? Legislative
Draft and Opinions of Experts, INTERFAX (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.interfax.by/news/
belarus/1172690 [https://perma.cc/55KB-BZUU].
20. Id.
21. See Summaries of the Chairmen of the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, SUP. CT.
REPUBLIC KAZ., http://sud.gov.kz/eng/content/chairmen-supreme-court-kazakhstan
[https://perma.cc/VK6D-YQFD] (last visited May 30, 2017). The last six chairmen have
been appointed during the post-Soviet period and yet all made their careers in law during
the Soviet period. See id.
22. Indira Kaumetova, N. Nazarbaev, Oboznachil Chetyre Napravleniia Uspeshnogo
Dvizhenia k Svobode i Demokratii [N. Nazarbayev Outlined Four Directions of Successful
Movement towards Freedom and Democracy], KAZ. 2050 (Mar. 6, 2016), https://
strategy2050.kz/ru/news/19022 [https://perma.cc/X9SL-CDSB].
23. See, e.g., Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case of Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms
and the Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice, 39 SOVIET STUDIES 531, 536–37 (1987).
24. Dmitri Nurumov, Has the New Kazakhstani Criminal Procedure Code Already
Fallen Short?, FAIR TRIALS (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.fairtrials.org/guest-post-hasthe-new-kazakhstani-criminal-procedure-code-already-fallen-short/ [https://perma.cc/
RG58-X5C4].
See generally UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [UPK RK] [Criminal Procedural Code] (1997) (Kaz.), translated in http://
adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z970000206_ [https://perma.cc/WBH3-79AT] [hereinafter
Criminal Procedural Code (1997)]; UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI
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KAZAKHSTAN [UPK RK] [Criminal Procedural Code] (2014) (Kaz.), translated in 50
STATUTES & DECISIONS, issues 2–6 (2015), http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/mrsd20/50/2
[https://perma.cc/WBG7-H9HB] [hereinafter Criminal Procedural Code (2014)].
25. See generally Normative Edicts, SUP. CT. REPUBLIC KAZ., http://sud.gov.kz/eng/
legislation/CAT01 [https://perma.cc/9BC4-XAW3] (last visited May 30, 2017).
26. Solomon, supra note 23, at 536.
27. Rauf Toimatov, Advokat, Eks-Sud’ia Verkhovnogo Suda RK [Attorney, ExJudge of the RK Supreme Court], Nado by Kak-To Napomnit’ Vsem Iuristam, A Sud’iam
– v Pervuiu Ochered’ - Chto Slovo ‘Iusticiia’ Perevoditsia Kak ‘Spravedlivost’ [One
Needs Somehow to Remind All Jurists, and Particularly Judges That the Word ‘Justice’ Is
Translated As ‘Fairness’], KAZTAG (May 31, 2011), https://zonakz.net/articles/34879
[https://perma.cc/VM2Z-JD43].
28. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
29. Oleg Gubaidulin, Ni Odnogo Chinovnika v Kazkahstane ne Privlekli k
Otvetstvennosti za Telefonnoe Pravo - Pakirdinov [Not a Single Government Official Had
Been Held Liable for Telephone Law - Pakirdinov], KARAVAN (Feb. 7, 2017), https://
www.caravan.kz/gazeta/ni-odnogo-chinovnika-v-kazakhstane-ne-privlekli-kotvetstvennosti-za-telefonnoe-pravo-pakirdinov-389962/ [https://perma.cc/YVM36D2X].
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various guiding explanations of the Supreme Court. 25 It is also entrenched in
the system of evaluating judicial performance through the importance
attached to “stability of sentencing,” the Soviet-era indicator of the number
of overturned sentences on appeal. 26 According to the former Supreme Court
Judge Rauf Toimatov, statistics of the overturned sentences were the “face of
our Themis that may not be spoiled.”27 State investigators and state
prosecutors remain the key actors in the criminal justice system that still view
denials of arrests and acquittals as unacceptable failures. They do their best
to overturn them on appeal and often succeed, as explained in Part III.
Appellate judges, most of whom received training in the Soviet period,
overturn a much higher proportion of acquittals than convictions and
themselves acquit a very small number of defendants. 28 The message to the
trial-level judges is clear: convict or have your Soviet-era indicator of
“stability of sentences” lowered with potential dismissal from the bench. It
is also clear that any meaningful criminal justice reform would have to focus
on the discretion of prosecutors as well as appellate judges—those who
oversee the functioning of the criminal justice system.
The second type of Soviet legacy, an embedded way of thinking and
behaving, is less formal. It is clearly present in Kazakhstan’s criminal justice
system and remains a backbone of the informal mechanism of conserving and
reproducing judicial deference to political bosses and law-enforcement
agencies. Even as a new generation of judges and prosecutors that never
worked in the Soviet-era enter the scene, old habits of mutual agreements and
cover-ups among them persist. In part, they persist because of wellentrenched impunity for violating formal criminal procedure. As one former
judge, who had spent about forty years working in all rungs of the judiciary,
in the Procuracy and presidential administration, recently lamented: “Not a
single government official had been held liable for telephone law.” 29 He
defined “telephone law”—a Soviet-era practice and a corruption
mechanism—as an illegal abuse of power by higher-ups giving orders to
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subordinates on how to decide cases. He admitted that he received and gave
such orders to his subordinates on the bench and in the Procuracy on how to
handle cases. According to him, telephone law continues to exist because, in
part, state functionaries rarely report these illegal requests, despite the fact
that the law requires them to report. 30
Additionally, while judges frequently and openly criticize the poor
quality of the work of state prosecutors, when it comes to deciding criminal
cases, judges tend to cover it up or give law-enforcement officials a second
chance. 31 Defense attorneys, who, in theory, could expose the cover-ups have
no real incentives to do so. As in the Soviet period, they are still low in
numbers (4,500 attorneys in 2015, up from 3,870 attorneys in 2009) and most
of them depend on the approval of law-enforcement officials to receive their
payments from the state budget for providing legal aid to the low-income
suspects. This dependency often leads to the corrupt deals between
investigators and the attorneys instead of high quality legal defense.32
Appellate judges who preserved their power to overturn acquittals,
thanks to the massive lobbying efforts of law-enforcement elites, do not
praise judges who acquit as heroes protecting judicial independence. And
lastly, court chairs, who remain important figures in the judicial system, tend
to recruit judicial candidates from the pool of trusted court clerks and judges’
assistants—insiders in the judicial system who are already imbued with the
sense of conformity to the orders of judicial bosses and state prosecutors in
criminal proceedings. 33 These types of legacies are at work in most postcommunist countries. 34
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s post-communist transformation added two new
pro-accusation incentives to the mix. Both the priority of reducing the prison
population while registering all crimes, and using the clearance rate as the
key indicator of the law enforcement performance has resulted in the
increased use of reconciliation to close criminal cases. 35 Under these policies,
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30. Id. For more on “telephone law,” see Kathryn Hendley, ‘Telephone Law’ and the
‘Rule of Law’: The Russian Case, HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 241, 241–62 (2009); Tatiana
Kyselova, Dualism of Ukrainian Commercial Courts: Exploratory Study, 6.2 HAGUE J. ON
RULE L. 178, 178–201 (2014); Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24.2 POSTSOVIET AFF. 324, 324–50 (2008); Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Politicians and Criminal
Prosecutions, in CRACKS IN THE MONOLITH: PARTY POWER IN THE BREZHNEV ERA 3, 3
(James Millar ed., 1992). See generally MARIA POPOVA, POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF COURTS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (2012).
31. See infra Part III.
32. Gulnar Suleimenova, Model’ Ugolovnogo Protsessa Kazakhstana [The Model of
Criminal Procedure of Kazakhstan], in DAS STRAFPROZESSUALE VORVERFAHREN IN
ZENTRALASIEN ZWISCHEN INQUISITORISCHEM UND ADVERSATORISCHEM MODELL 160–61
(Friedrich-Christian Schroeder & Manuchehr Kudratov eds., 2012).
33. Lydia Muller, Judicial Administration in Transitional Eastern Countries, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 937, 949–50 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).
34. Aleksandr Khechumyan & Satenik Margaryan, The Practice of Pretrial Detention
in Armenia: An Examination of the Role of the Soviet Legacy, 21 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y
& RES. 117, 130–31 (2015); Trochev, supra note 12, at 154.
35. Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp Asanov: Kazakh Penitentiary System
Needs Drastic Changes to Reduce the Number of Prison Population, INTERFAX (May
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investigators, prosecutors, and judges have a strong incentive to work
together to convince the victim and the accused to reconcile. Reconciliation
is less labor-intensive and risky than conducting a full-blown investigation or
a trial. Additionally, if appellate courts cancel the reconciliation the careers
of investigators, prosecutors, and judges, are not harmed.
Another pro-reconciliation incentive for judges is protecting their
careers. Judgeship is now better paid and more prestigious. Judges often
switched between professions in the Soviet era, but judges now receive
generous salaries with retirement benefits that make it too attractive for them
to change careers. 36 State prosecutors, however, may influence judges who
disagree with them because they could bring charges of incompetence,
suspicious leniency, and selling of judicial decisions, all of which are bases
for potential dismissal, if judges disagree with the state prosecutors over
detentions or convictions. Judges have little protection against unfounded
accusations in the face of the public’s distrust of the judiciary, the politicians’
haste to blame them for corruption, and the media’s sensational reports of
judicial bribery. As a result, trial judges strengthen their existing
relationships, loyalties, and friendships with state prosecutors and appellate
judges. 37 The rest of this Article analyzes the remarkable continuity in the
patterns of pre-trial detentions, demonstrates the impact of this mix of Soviet
legacy and post-Soviet incentives on avoiding the acquittals (except for in
fledgling jury trials), and explores how and why the new post-Soviet policy
of closing criminal cases on the basis of reconciliation fits well with the
existing relationships within the law-enforcement community.
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2014), https://www.interfax.kz/?lang=eng&int_id=13&news_id=87 [https://perma.cc/
45UA-UGK2]; Kazakhstan President Calls to Zero Tolerance for Crime, TENGRI NEWS
(Sep. 2, 2013), https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-President-calls-to-zerotolerance-for-crime-22298/ [https://perma.cc/SD37-6DEK]; PRI Central Asia Hosts
Roundtable on a Draft New Resocialisation Strategy in Kazakhstan, PENAL REFORM INT’L
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.penalreform.org/news/pri-hosts-roundtable-draft-newresocialisation-strategy-kazakhstan/ [https://perma.cc/PFN5-MLYP]; Prison Population
in Kazakhstan Reduced to 41,000, KAZINFORM (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.inform.kz/en/
prison-population-in-kazakhstan-reduced-to-41-000_a2825487 [https://perma.cc/C6V6U8LT].
36. Trochev, supra note 12, at 154.
37. Id.
38. See Todd Foglesong, The Reform of Criminal Justice and Evolution of Judicial
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II. Wholesale Approval of Pre-Trial Detention: A Remarkable
Continuity
The informal relationships between judges and state prosecutors during
the first two decades of independent Kazakhstan have been remarkably
stable. The criminal justice system in the last years of the USSR witnessed
both the domination of the Procuracy (the centralized state agency in charge
of both detaining and prosecuting accused persons, and supervising the
judiciary’s work) and the increasing role of appellate level courts in
maintaining judicial discipline through career-related sanctions of local
judges. 38
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The collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union did little to break
this structure of incentives—quantitative indicators inherited from the Sovietera remain the key tools for assessing performance of law enforcement
agencies and judges. 39 Until 2013, investigators—most of whom work in the
police force—were rewarded based on the numbers of criminal cases sent to
court. 40 Naturally, having the accused in custody makes investigating the
crime and completing the criminal case much easier. At the same time,
Kazakhstan faced the challenge of reducing its prison population, which
included persons held in custody—a challenge that was made visible by
international shaming. 41
In the early 2000s, with 591 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants,
Kazakhstan was one of the top five countries with the highest number of
prisoners per capita. 42 As of November 2016, Kazakhstan’s prison
population rate is the sixty-second highest in the world at 221 prisoners per
100,000 inhabitants (which is lower than the prison population rates of
Turkmenistan, Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Ukraine). 43 As Kazakhstan’s then Procurator General Askhat Daulbayev
proudly announced on January 15, 2016, Kazakhstan’s prison population fell
below 40,000 to 39,945 “for the first time,” and placed the country “on par
with the leading European countries.” 44 One reason for this rapid decline of
prison population from almost 85,000 in 2002 to less than 50,000 in 2014 is
that pre-trial detention became less frequent. Table 1 shows the declining
number of defendants held in custody before trial.
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Dependence in Late Soviet Russia, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN RUSSIA, 1864-1996: POWER,
CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 282, 287–88, 303 (Peter Solomon, Jr. ed.,
1997) (explaining that rates of reversal affect a judge’s performance rating and that broad
appellate review gave the higher courts considerable influence over lower courts).
39. See id. at 287.
40. See infra Part III; Khechumyan & Margaryan supra note 34, at 127 (noting that
evaluations of law enforcement and prosecutors are based on clearance rates and
convictions, but weak institutional capacity to solve crimes leads to overreliance on
confessions and failure to register the more obviously unsolvable crimes).
41. See Edward Schatz & Elena Maltseva, Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian “Persuasion”,
28 POST-SOVIET AFF. 45, 49–50 (2012) (explaining that the Organization for Security and
Cooperation promotes Western democracy though human rights and election monitoring
mechanisms, so when authoritarian Kazakhstan became their chair the other members
demanded that Kazakhstan promote political liberalization reforms).
42. ROY WALMSLEY, GLOBAL INCARCERATION AND PRISON TRENDS, at 66–67, U.N.
Sales No, E.04.IV.5 (2003).
43. Highest to Lowest, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highestto-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/
84EA-C4X2] (last visited Nov. 13. 2016).
44. Askhat Daulbayev, Opening Remarks at the Enlarged Meeting of the Board of the
General Prosecutor’s Office, GEN. PROSECUTOR’S OFF. REPUBLIC KAZ. (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://prokuror.gov.kz/rus/novosti/press-releasy/vstupitelnoe-slovo-generalnogoprokurora-ashata-daulbaeva-na-rasshirennom-0 [https://perma.cc/S3FD-YLBT].
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Table 1. Pre-trial detainees in Kazakhstan, 2000–2015 45
Number in
Percentage
Pre-trial/Remand Population Rate
Year Pre-trial/Remand
of Total
(per 100,000 of
Imprisonment
Prison Population
national population)

2000

16,498

21.1%

113

2005

8,324

15.8%

55

2010

7,903

12.5%

50

2014

6,601

13.2%

38

2015

5,775

14.1%

33

2016

5,680

14.5%

32
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45. Kazakhstan, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/
Kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/K2SB-SD7K] (last visited Nov. 13. 2016).
46. Trochev, supra note 12, at 156.
47. Id.; Criminal Procedural Code (1997), supra note 24.
48. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Prior to August 30, 2008, Kazakhstani procurators formally shared with
judges the power to approve pre-trial detention, while in practice procurators
approved most detentions. On average, procurators approved about 94% of
pre-trial detentions requested by investigators. 46 On August 30, 2008, judges
gained the exclusive power to approve detention requests in a separate
hearing with the accused, the defense attorney, and the state procurator
present. Importantly, until January 2015, judges were not allowed to choose
the pre-trial regime of the accused; they could only approve or deny the
request of the procurator. 47 Not surprisingly, this limited discretion to detain
did not result in change on the ground. In the remainder of 2008, Kazakhstani
judges approved 98% of detention requests (6,928 accused) and denied 2%
of detention requests (144 accused). 48 Between 2009 and 2014, judges
consistently approved detention requests: 96% in both 2009 (24,137 detained)
and 2010 (19,457 detained), 94.5% in 2012 (10,318 detained), 94.4% in 2013
(13,568 detained), and 97.2% in 2014 (12,148 detained). 49 As expected, the
2014 Criminal Procedure Code and the newly appointed investigative judges
in charge of approving detention requests did not make a difference: 94.7%
(11,528 detained) of detention requests have been approved in 2015, and
95.3% (11,632 detained) in 2016. 50
By contrast, the change in incentives for procurators did make a
difference in the patterns of pre-trial detention. As the falling numbers of
detained defendants throughout the last decade clearly shows, procurators
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(reporting that corruption “of prosecutors is a real concern in Kazakhstan”).
54. Viktoriia Shevchenko, Glavnyi Kapital – Dobroe Imia [Main Capital – Good
Name], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (Sep. 23, 2010).
55. Olga Semenova, Na Pomoshch Femide Pridet Internet [Internet Will Come to
Help Themis], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA, at 4 (Jan. 15, 2011).
56. Id.
57. See Highest to Lowest, supra note 43.
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have been sending fewer detention requests to judges. For example, in 2012,
procurators refused to support 10% (1,090) of detentions that investigators
asked for and asked for bail or requested house arrest in less than 1% of all
coercive measures. 51 The new Criminal Procedure Code in force since 2015
expanded discretion of procurators even further. In 2015, procurators denied
support for 21% (2,306) of detention requests, released 74 wrongfully
arrested persons from detention cells, and released 15,766 accused on bail.
In 2016, they denied support for 31% (3,552) of detention requests, released
462 wrongfully arrested persons from detention cells, and released 13,421
accused on bail. 52 This trend indicates that procurators now scrutinize the
work of investigators more attentively than they did ten years ago when
procurators did not have to ask for a judge’s approval for the detention of the
accused. But judge-enforced habeas corpus protections do not motivate
procurators to conduct this heightened scrutiny. Instead, this hesitation to ask
judges for detention mostly comes from the top. The Procurator General has
to report to the President on how his agency is helping to reduce prison
population and insists on fewer detentions from his subordinates.
Another incentive that may works against requesting detention comes
from corrupt deals struck between the prosecutors and defendants. 53 For
example, one seasoned judge complained that he received many phone calls
from the higher-ups demanding the release of one well-connected gangster
from detention. 54 Importantly, in practice, neither judges nor procurators face
any penalties for detaining someone who is subsequently released from
custody due to closed criminal cases before the trial. For example, in 2010,
three out of ten defendants held in pre-trial detention were released due to
their criminal case being closed. 55 Then Supreme Court Chairman, Musabek
Alimbekov, argued that judges should be held responsible for unjustified
detentions—but only after empowering judges to obtain complete
information about the accusations and the defendant and removing the
procurator from the detention hearing. 56 As Table 1 shows, at the end of
2015, those detained made up 14% of prisoners, as compared to 18% in
Russia, 19% in Belarus, 24% in Ukraine, and 17% in Azerbaijan.57
Monitoring of detention hearings by domestic and international human
rights observers showed that Kazakhstani judges agree to detain for reasons
other than the existence of convincing evidence against the accused. In one
out of three cases, law-enforcement officials did not even try to justify the
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necessity of arrests—judges approved them automatically. 58 In one out of
seven cases law enforcement officials justified detention solely on the basis
of the severity of crime—contrary to the standard of the Supreme Court
holding that the severity of crime alone cannot be the grounds for approving
detention. 59 As the chairman of the Pavlodar City Court No.2, Aslambek
Mergaliev, confirmed at the end of 2013: “[I]n our work we sometimes face
an opinion that someone who is accused of a grave crime will automatically
be kept in custody.” 60
Monitoring of detention hearings also showed that in nine out of ten
cases, judges failed to ask the defendant if she or he suffered from illegal
methods of investigation (procurators asked the same question in 1% of
observed cases). 61 Judges openly admit that they approve detention requests
if they contain falsified timing of the initial arrest (seventy-two hours is the
maximum length of arrest without judicial approval), no data about initial
arrest of the accused, if detention requests contain no reasoning for the
detention (Criminal Procedure Code requires a “reasoned” detention request),
and if the procurator keeps silent during the detention hearing. 62 In these
situations, judges issue formal warnings to the procurators, yet still approve
the detention requests. In turn, procurators respond that “measures have been
taken” to address these warnings, yet continue to falsify data in the detention
requests and to fail to provide reasons for detention, and, in effect, violate the
due process rights of the accused. 63
The chairman of the Aktobe Province Court, Erlan Aitzhanov, revealed
the reason for this wholesale approval: if the accused are later nowhere to be
found, judges who release the accused are automatically punished via
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58. JUDICIAL SANCTIONING OF ARREST IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
ANALYTICAL REPORT 29 (2011), http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=3010&l=ru [https:/
/perma.cc/Z6K5-M8R8]; see also ASTANA BRANCH KAZAKHSTANI INT’L BUREAU HUM.
RTS., SANCTIONING OF ARREST BY THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF THE
MONITORING CONDUCTED IN THE COURTS OF AQTAU, ALMATY, KOSTANAY, PAVLODAR,
AND UST-KAMENOGORSK (2010), https://bureau.kz/news/download/152.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JMZ4-E2CT].
59. Id.
60. Sanktsija ɬa Arest Dolzhna Byt’ Obosnovannoi [Arrest Sanction Must Be WellGrounded], ZAKON (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.zakon.kz/4589614-sankcija-na-arestdolzhna-byt.html [https://perma.cc/38XR-E3QM].
61. JUDICIAL SANCTIONING OF ARREST IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, supra note
58, at 53; see ASTANA BRANCH KAZAKHSTANI INT’L BUREAU HUM. RTS., supra note 58, at
54.
62. See, e.g., Zhaksylyk Alanov, Tol’ko v Iskliuchitel’nykh Sluchaiakh. Pri
Rassmotrenii Sudami Khodataistv Prokurora o Sanktsionirovanii Mery Presecheniia v
Vide Aresta Dopuskaiutsia Otdel’nye Narusheniia Zakona [Only in Exceptional Cases.
Some Violations of Law Occur during Judicial Consideration of Procurator’s Detention
Requests], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Apr. 5, 2013), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/
?doc_id=31355340 [https://perma.cc/6RZG-8BUG]; Diias Makhambetov, Soglasno
Bukve Zakona [According to the Letter of the Law], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Mar. 20,
2013),
http://www.zakon.kz/4547881-soglasno-bukve-zakona.-osnovanija-dlja.html
[https://perma.cc/E5V6-3ZKB].
63. Id.
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disciplinary proceedings initiated by law enforcement officials. 64 This
incentive is strong in the courts of his province, which disagreed with only
2% of pre-trial detention requests, as Table 2 shows. A former trial-level
judge from the Pavlodar Province confirms that a judge who dares to deny a
detention request is personally responsible for the disappearing of the accused
in addition to the suspicion of judicial corruption. According to this former
judge, “virtually any judge could be criminally charged in this situation for
issuing illegal judicial act under Article 350 of the 1997 Criminal Code of
Kazakhstan.” 65 Table 2 also shows a growing inter-provincial variation in
wholesale approval of detention requests. This variation does not always
depend on the numbers of requested detentions, which have been rising in the
largest urban centers of Almaty and Astana. Data in Table 2 also provide no
clear evidence to support the claim that procurators request fewer yet wellreasoned detentions. For example, judges in Atyrau, East Kazakhstan, and
Karaganda provinces now receive fewer requests yet deny the same
proportion (10%) of them. 66
Figure 1. Map of Kazakhstan
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64. Svetlana Merkulova, Enough Producing the Arrested!, OKO (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.oko.kz/uridicheskiy-klub/chvatit-plodit-arestantov.
65. Interview with Former Judge, in Astana, Kaz. (Apr. 2014). Under Article 350 of
the then in force Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
1. Knowingly illegal sentencing by a judge (judges) decision or another judicial
act, shall be punished by a fine ranging from five hundred to seven hundred
monthly calculation indices or with the deprivation of liberty for a period up to
five years with the deprivation of the right to hold specific posts or to practice a
specific activity for a period up to three years.
Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 350.
66. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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Table 2. Pre-trial Detentions (Total Number and as a Percentage of All Detention
Requests) in Kazakhstan, 2011–2015, by Province, in the Order of Declining Rate of
Judicial Approval of Detention Requests in 2015 67
PROVINCE

2011

North
Kazakhstan

562 (93%)

495 (96%)

425 (93%)

396 (99%)

307 (100%)

Aktobe

490 (98%)

419 (98%)

436 (98%)

460 (99%)

390 (98%)

1,336 (97%)

1,147 (97%)

981 (96%)

1,071 (98%)

659 (97%)

Pavlodar

423 (97%)

395 (95%)

398 (93%)

410 (93%)

419 (97%)

Kyzyl-Orda

404 (97%)

411 (99%)

421 (95%)

358 (92%)

273 (97%)

West Kazakhstan

405 (96%)

478 (95%)

477 (97%)

505 (91%)

496 (96%)

Kostanay

707 (96%)

596 (97%)

537 (98%)

439 (97%)

499 (96%)

Almaty City

1,949 (95%)

1,697 (97%)

2,392 (98%)

1,833 (98%)

2,283 (95%)

South
Kazakhstan

1,227 (95%)

1,396 (96%)

1,555 (95%)

1,571 (98%)

1,382 (95%)

Karaganda

1,281 (95%)

1,219 (96%)

1303 (94%)

1,120 (97%)

895 (95%)

Mangistau

333 (95%)

386 (93%)

384 (95%)

276 (93%)

419 (95%)

Akmola

612 (94%)

602 (96%)

557 (97%)

454 (98%)

373 (94%)

Astana City

774 (94%)

868 (90%)

929 (94%)

937 (95%)

1,006 (94%)

Atyrau

376 (93%)

353 (94%)

316 (95%)

258 (93%)

235 (93%)

1,477 (91%)

1,511 (89%)

1,624 (86%)

1,253 (89%)

1,262 (91%)

987 (90%)

902 (90%)

777 (92%)

774 (97%)

659 (90%)

Almaty Province

East Kazakhstan
Zhambyl

2012

2013

2014

2015
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67. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
68. See Trochev, supra note 12, at 164.
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In short, the transfer of the power to detain from the procurators to judges
did not make much difference. Judges play the same role as procurators did
prior to 2008: neither the former nor the latter are interested in attentively
scrutinizing the work of detectives and investigators or paying serious
attention to the arguments of defense attorneys. Now judges approve
detention with the same frequency as procurators did in the past: processing
detention requests instead of carefully scrutinizing them. Meanwhile,
procurators no longer prioritize pre-trial detentions in order to follow the
official line of reducing the prison population set by President Nazarbayev in
response to international shaming. Kazakhstan’s judicial chiefs seem to have
learned from other post-communist countries, which introduced judicial
arrest warrants prior to 2008, that judicial empowerment would not
necessarily result in more serious checks of detention requests. 68 Indeed, as
the outputs of criminal prosecution (closing cases, sending them back to the
prosecutors, and issuing sentences) show, judges process criminal cases and
remain junior partners in the criminal justice system.
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III. Avoiding Exoneration and Acquittals as in the Soviet Period
Article 24 of the 1997 Criminal Procedure Code (much like its Sovietera predecessor) required investigators, prosecutors, and judges to explore
both incriminating and exonerating facts “fully, objectively[,] and in allrounded manner.” 69 This requirement has been preserved in Article 24 of the
2014 Criminal Procedure Code. 70 In practice, however, investigators,
prosecutors, and judges rarely seek out or pay attention to exonerating
evidence. As one judge who worked in Procuracy for twenty years,
confessed, “this law-enforcement structure has built-in accusatory bias,” and
it was psychologically difficult for him to transform himself from a procurator
to a judge. 71 The research on Soviet criminal justice during late socialism has
documented the decline of acquittal rates from 9% in 1945 to less than 1% at
the end of Soviet era. 72 Soviet judges, whose salaries and careers depended
on the Justice Ministry and Communist Party bosses, were strongly expected
to convict the accused or, in cases with shoddy evidence, to convict on less
harsh criminal charges, or to return cases back to procurators for
supplementary investigation at the end of the trial—in effect giving the
prosecution a second chance. 73 A former judge from the city of Semipalatinsk
Askar Mardanov describes what happened after he had acquitted four persons
in late 1980s:

Judge Mardanov’s example, however, was very rare. Most often,
cassation courts would overturn acquittals at the request of the procurators,
who had a much stronger influence on Communist Party bosses. 75 Acquittals
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Criminal Procedural Code (1997), supra note 24.
Criminal Procedural Code (2014), supra note 24.
Shevchenko, supra note 54.
Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 539–40.
Id.
Farkhat Kinzhitaev, Kogda Vershitsja Pravosudie [When Justice is Meted Out],
INDUSTRIALNAIA KARAGANDA (Apr. 22, 2014), http://inkaraganda.kz/articles/105715
[https://perma.cc/2W5R-JGZ4].
75. GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 107–13 (1996).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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I presided in a trial against twenty-five persons in the case of a group theft from the
local wool factory. It was a famous case, in which investigation lasted nine months,
and one half of the accused was in custody. The Central Committee of the
Republic’s Communist Party, the Party Committee of the Province, and lawenforcement organs closely monitored the trial. My boss [said], “You answer with
your head for legality and validity of the sentence.” But there were no orders on
how to judge and how many years of imprisonment to give to whom. The problems
began after I had acquitted four persons and they had been set free in the courtroom.
Detectives, investigators, and procurators started a fuss because they would not
receive a pat on their heads for wrongful indictment. And issuing an acquittal in
those days was a risky business. Honestly, that judgment was a difficult one. Now,
after so many years, I shudder to recall how I felt. I risked my honor and dignity.
And I was pleased when I learned that the Supreme Court of the Kazakh Soviet
Socialist Republic, having reviewed the appeal of the procurator, confirmed our
sentence. Although, as I have learned later, the Supreme Court had been pressured
to overturn the acquittal. 74
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were extraordinary events and were considered equivalent to a failure of the
prosecution, with potentially serious repercussions for the careers of
procurators. 76 Acquittals were also extraordinary for judges, who, in the
event of an acquittal, would be acting as whistleblowers in a closed law
enforcement system. 77 Many acquittals would be overturned on appeal by
cassation courts at the request of the procurators, who had a much stronger
influence on Communist Party bosses. 78 Meanwhile, cassation courts
acquitted extremely rarely. 79
Fast-forward a quarter of a century. As Table 3 shows, until 2013,
Kazakhstani procurators exonerated defendants in no more than 3% of
criminal cases. Until 2012, the number of cases that resulted in conviction—
the key criterion of Soviet criminal justice—was the only indicator of their
job performance. In 2012, procurators began adding the number of cases they
had closed before trial on non-rehabilitative ground (i.e., when the accused
reconciled with the victim or actively repented) to the number of cases that
resulted in conviction. 80 Procuracy chiefs did this in order to maintain a low
prison population while insisting on total crime registration and zero
tolerance for crimes. As a result, procurators on the ground began closing
cases more frequently instead of sending them to courts for trial. In 2013,
Procuracy chiefs went further and began rewarding their subordinates for
closing criminal cases on exonerating grounds, or, in essence, for performing
the first external and meaningful check of the job of police detectives and
investigators. As Table 3 shows, in 2013 alone, state prosecutors closed
18,346 criminal cases on exonerating grounds—more than in the previous six
years combined. 81 As shown below, this jump resulted in fewer cases closed
on exonerating grounds by judges at the trial stage.
Table 3. Procurators’ Decisions in Criminal Cases in Kazakhstan, 2008–2016 82

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016
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Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 533–34.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Trochev, supra note 12, at 153.
Bainur Baigeldi, Prosecutor’s Supervision of Human Rights Observance in the
Republic of Kazakhstan, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 217, 220 (2015); see PRAVSTAT
[OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
82. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. For comparison, data for
2015 excludes criminal misdemeanors from the total number of crimes. Until 2015,
misdemeanors were not criminal and were included in the Code of Administrative
Offenses. The 2014 Criminal Code contains misdemeanors, which used to be included in
the Code of Administrative Offenses.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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Total

140,249 131,548 132,183 204,212 306,898 386,710 377,330 362,089 363,222

Sent to
Courts

73,351

72,299

69,700

63,893

58,607

65,318

59,532

50,376

56,050

Closed on
Nonrehabilitative
Grounds

9,262

7,619

6,782

9,974

26,134

34,153

47,772

55,243

64,383

Closed on
Exonerating
Grounds

1,864

1,630

1,373

6,609

4,664

18,346

32,792

174,628 144,972

83. REPORT ON THE SITUATION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
2011, at 142 (2012), http://www.bureau.kz/news/download/337.doc [https://perma.cc/
T8FL-KMVC].
84. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: ProcuratorGeneral Criticizes Everyone, V LAST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://vlast.kz/politika/
nazarbaev_provel_sovesshanie_s_silovikami_genprokuror_kritikuet_vseh-1190.html
[https://perma.cc/RY3F-Q82J].
85. Id.
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What sparked this approval of exonerations? Realization that the
growing number of poorly-prepared criminal cases would lead to more
convictions, obstructing the goal of reducing the prison population in the long
term. As Presidential Human Rights Commission concluded at the end of
2011, “not infrequently violations of the constitutional rights of citizens occur
because detectives and investigators improperly perform their duties, have
low-level of professional training[,] and lack the basic knowledge of the
criminal procedure legislation and of the international-legal acts in the sphere
of human rights, ratified by Kazakhstan.” 83 In January 2013, the then
Procurator General of Kazakhstan, Askhat Daulbayev, was more frank:
“systemic weaknesses and gaps continue to exist in the activities of any and
all law enforcement agencies and the judicial system.” 84 According to
Daulbayev, in 2012, procurators received over 100,000 complaints against
the poor quality of criminal investigation. 85
As in Soviet times, some members of the Kazakhstani government
continue to consider acquittal and exoneration equivalent to failure, and such
failure can result in denial of job-related bonuses or even demotion for
investigators and procurators. The recently appointed Procurator-General
Zhakyp Asanov publicly criticized this Soviet-era thinking. He complained
that his subordinates were scared of acquittals: “Prosecutors have an old
stereotype: we are scared of acquittals, when prosecutors and judges go easy
on the defendants and hand out a minimal punishment [instead of
acquitting].” He also scolded supervisors of prosecutors who pressure rankand-file prosecutors and demand conviction at all costs by becoming hostages
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to the prior pre-trial detention of the defendant and submission of the case to
trial. 86
Judges also often criticize the performance of investigators and
procurators. Yet the former almost universally agrees with the conclusions
of the latter when it comes to deciding criminal cases. 87 The performance of
judges is assessed by the stability of sentences, an indicator inherited from
the late-Soviet era—good judges have none, or very few, of their decisions
reversed, while poorly performing judges have several overturned
judgments. 88 As is shown below, acquittals have a much higher chance of
being overturned on appeal. At the same time, judges have a general interest
of reducing their caseload, and thus, approve the expansion of procurators’
discretion in preventing shoddy criminal cases from being sent to courts.
Indeed, as Table 4 shows, between 2010 and 2016, judges receive fewer
criminal cases and convict fewer defendants.
To avoid both reversals and acquittals in cases with weak evidence,
judges sometimes refused to decide cases and demanded supplementary
investigations, and thus, shifted responsibility for handling shoddy
investigations to procurators, who, in turn, quietly closed the cases.89
Between 2007 and 2012, Kazakhstani judges returned to procurators about
1.2% of all cases for supplementary investigation (between 450 and 540 cases
each year), and, in effect, gave state prosecutors a second chance. 90 State
prosecutors brought back for trial only half of those cases. 91 According to
one former judge, such outcomes satisfied both judges and procurators
because it minimized risks for both. 92 This proportion (1.2% sent for
supplementary investigation and 1% returned cases to procurators) is similar
to Soviet-era figures. 93 In the late 1980s, judges in the USSR returned some
4–5% of criminal cases for supplementary investigation instead of handing
down acquittals. 94 In November 2011, the Chairman of the Supreme Court
proposed to eliminate this Soviet-era judicial mechanism of avoiding
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86. Genprokuror RK Vstal na Zashchitu Opravdatel’nykh Prigovorov [The RK
Procurator-General Rose to Defend Acquittals], B NEWS (July 22, 2016), http://bnews.kz/
ru/news/obshchestvo/genprokuror_rk_vstal_na_zashchitu_opravdatelnih_prigovorov
-2016_07_22-1282677 [https://perma.cc/5KEX-YWUJ]; Zhakyp Asanov: Prokurory
Boiatsia Opravdatel’nykh Prigovorov [Zhakyp Asanov: Procurators Are Afraid of
Acquittals], KAZINFORM (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.inform.kz/ru/zhakip-asanovprokurory-boyatsya-opravdatel-nyh-prigovorov_a2967843 [https://perma.cc/L7U69CZC].
87. Trochev, supra note 12, at 154–55.
88. Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 542.
89. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
90. I exclude cases that are returned to procurators on the grounds of the
disappearance of the accused.
91. Trochev, supra note 12.
92. Askar Kishkembaev, Is It Easy to Issue an Acquittal?, IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA
(Mar. 16, 2006), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30048629 [https://perma.cc/
7RPT-ZATG].
93. See Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 541.
94. Id. at 552 (citing Arkadii Vaksberg, Pravde v glaza, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 13
(1986)).
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95. Courts of Kazakhstan Will Not Send Cases for Supplementary Investigation,
TENGRI NEWS (Nov. 11 2011), http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/201297 [https://
perma.cc/TC5M-56TE].
96. Doverie Grazhdan–Prezhde Vsego [The Trust of Citizens—Especially],
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.kazpravda.kz/articles/view/
doverie-grazhdan—prezhde-vsego/ [https://perma.cc/973L-BX5B].
97. Id.
98. See infra Table 4.
99. See, e.g., Andrea Schmitz & Alexander Wolters, Political Protest in Central Asia:
Potentials and Dynamics, SWP 22 (2012), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP07_smz_wolters.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4ZV4-QK46].
100. See PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
101. Bulat Dembai, Rol’ Prokurora v Ugolovnom Protsesse [The Role of the
Prosecutor in Criminal Proceedings], GEN. PROSECUTOR’S OFF. REPUBLIC KAZ., http://
m.prokuror.kz/rus/o-prokurature/20-let-konstitucii-respubliki-kazahstan/rol-prokurora-vugolovnom-processe [https://perma.cc/6PZH-DR7S] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
102. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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acquittals. 95 The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code eventually banned judges
from sending criminal cases back to procurators for “supplementary
investigation.” However, judges continued to return cases instead of deciding
them. 96 The former Deputy Chief Procurator General, Nurmakhanbet Isaev,
publicly complained that he had to have a special meeting with provincial
judges and the Supreme Court at the end of 2015 to cease this practice.
According to Isaev, “a person should leave the courthouse as either convicted
or acquitted. There is no third option.” 97 His complaints clearly show his
dissatisfaction with the unwillingness of judges to change their ways of
handling sloppy cases and with amicable relationships among trial judges and
prosecutors.
This proportion of cases sent by judges back to procurators is about the
same as the proportion of cases closed on exonerating grounds and acquittals
taken together. 98 The proportion of cases closed on exonerating grounds is
unstable because it is often driven by the political mood of those on the top
and by what judges receive from the procurators. 99 In 2010, most of the cases
closed on exonerating grounds were group thefts. In 2011, drug-related and
road traffic crimes. And in 2012, illegal business activity. 100 In 2012, the
General Procuracy conducted a campaign, “Business Shall Be Defended
against Wrongful Conviction!” that consisted of reviewing completed
criminal cases against businesspersons. As a result, judges exonerated 290
businesspersons. 101 These kinds of campaigns reflect another late Soviet-era
legacy of holding short-term propaganda campaigns. Local procurators and
judges tend to view these campaigns as an additional burden imposed from
the top in which judges still automatically approve prosecutorial decisions
rather than an exercise fairness and attention to victims of wrongful
prosecution. As Table 4 shows, in 2013 and 2014, during which no
campaigns were waged, there was still a threefold jump in procurator-made
exonerations, while judges exonerated only fifty people (nineteen of them in
cases of private prosecution) in thirty-five criminal cases. 102 It is much easier
and less risky for the judge to close a case than to issue a sentence.
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Table 4. Outcomes of Criminal Cases in Kazakhstan’s Trial-Level Courts, 2010–
2016 103
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015*

2016*

Total Number of Cases
with Sentence

30,364

22,012

18,230

21,833

20,571

18,688

18,676

Convicted Defendants

36,477

27,380

22,292

26,968

25,079

22,325

21,386

Acquitted Defendants

705

482

400

507

478

357

369

539
(819)

540
(882)

457
(768)

446
(731)

435
(690)

481

421

520

797

1,131

884

861

Cases Closed

21,490

22,293

21,257

20,922

18,649

10,564

9,938

Including Cases Closed
on the Grounds of
Reconciliation between
the Accused and the
Victim

18,701

19,764

17,001

19,392

16,639

9,974

9,298

45
(93)

701
(774)

176
(185)

21
(29)

14
(21)

362
(451)

209
(331)

Cases Returned for
Supplementary
Investigation
(Defendants)
Cases Returned to
Procurators, Excluding
Cases in Which the
Defendant Has
Disappeared

Including Cases Closed
on Exonerating Grounds
(Exonerated Defendants)
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103. Id. For a comparison, data for 2015 and 2016 exclude criminal misdemeanors,
introduced by the 2014 Criminal Code, which previously have been included in the 2001
Code of Administrative Offenses. Criminal misdemeanors constitute about one-third of
all criminal cases handled by the courts in both 2015 and 2016.
104. See, e.g., Kazakhstan: Executive Summary, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2005/Kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/NU8W8FFN] (last visited May 30, 2017).
105. See Trochev, supra note 12, at 169.
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As Table 4 shows, acquittal rates in Kazakhstan went up to 1.9% (478
tried persons) in 2014, 1.6% (357 tried persons) in 2015, and 1.7% (369 tried
persons) in 2016. The absolute number of acquitted, however, did not change
much since the early 2000s (423 acquitted persons in 2000, 383 in 2001, and
334 in 2002). 104 Indeed, the growing rates of acquittals are misleading
because the tripling of acquittal rates is largely due to high rates of acquittal
in two categories of criminal cases: cases of private prosecution, like libel or
battery, in which state prosecutors do not participate and judges seem to avoid
accusatorial bias, and cases decided by jury trials, which disrupt the cozy
relationship between judges and procurators. 105
Indeed, in 2010, acquittals in cases of private prosecution, where the
judge receives a written complaint from the victim directly or through the
police or the local Procuracy office (in contrast to the criminal case file
provided by the procurator), tripled and reached 85% of acquittals in all
criminal cases, as compared to 29% of all acquittals issued between 2000 and
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2002. 106 The entry in force of the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure
Code in 2015 did not make much difference: the high share of acquittals in
criminal cases of private prosecution remained at 93% in 2016. 107 As data on
criminal cases of private prosecution makes clear, judges reject almost 90%
of all received complaints, close more than a half of these cases, 108 and decide
on the merits only those cases in which plaintiffs insist that they have strong
evidence against the defendants. Judges tend not to reconcile the litigants,
and to acquit more than convict in these cases. This is not because plaintiffs
bring weak cases, but because judges are not accountable to state prosecutors.
Table 5. Criminal Cases of Private Prosecution in Kazakhstan, 2010–2016 109
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total Number
of Cases

5,077

3,073

2,105

1,956

2,928

5,301

7,041

Number of
Cases Closed

2,962

1,832

1,370

1,110

1,671

3,897

5,197

Total Number
of Cases with a
Sentence

1,338

708

383

454

565

1,192

1,520

Persons
Convicted

968

408

178

184

238

867

845

Persons
Acquitted

599

388

318

436

437

581

729

Percentage of
Acquitted
Persons in All
Criminal Cases

85%

80%

80%

86%

91%

67%

93%

Acquittals in cases of public prosecution (where the procurator
represents the prosecution) continue to decline, as they did in the late Sovietera: from 106 acquitted persons in 2010 to 71 in 2013, then 41 in 2014, 42 in
2015, 46 in 2016. Drug-related crimes, a category of crime that is often used
by police to fabricate criminal charges, constituted the largest share of
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106. See, e.g., Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Reporter Drug Case Acquittal Marks Rare
Reprieve, EURASIANET (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77596 [https://
perma.cc/LW7M-2ARZ]. For data support, see infra Table 5.
107. See infra Table 5.
108. If a victim recalls a complaint in the criminal case of private prosecution, the case
is automatically closed.
109. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. Data for 2015 and 2016
include criminal misdemeanors.
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acquittals in 2010. 110 These crimes, together with white-collar crimes like
fraud and abuse of power, composed the majority of acquittals in 2011 and
2012. 111 In 2016, the largest share of acquittals was made up of those accused
of violating labor law and of fraud. 112
Jury trials, which have been used in judging grave crimes like rape and
murder since 2007, are responsible for about one-third of acquittals in
criminal cases of public prosecution. 113 Leaving aside the debate about
whether these trials are trials by real juries, quasi-juries, or a judge with the
extended group of lay assessors, these trials show that it is possible to have
an adversarial criminal procedure and overcome accusatorial bias. 114 This is
because judges can shift the blame for acquitting to the jurors. As Table 6
shows, even though ten jurors deliberate the verdict together with a
professional judge, until 2014, the acquittal rate in jury trials has never been
below 6%. Until 2014, jury acquittals made up, on average, about one-third
of all acquittals in criminal trials of public prosecution.115
Table 6. Outcomes of the Jury Trials in Kazakhstan, 2007–2016 116
2007
(36)

2008
(44)

2009
(59)

2010
(270)

2011
(355)

2012
(288)

2013
(190)

2014
(64)

2015
(42)

2016
(47)

Defendants
Convicted

57

72

101

334

461

355

289

118

59

67

Defendants
Acquitted

5

6

15

43

30

24

30

3

2

8

Percentage
of Acquitted
to the Total
Number of
Acquitted in
Cases of
Public
Prosecution
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5%
41%
32%
29% 42%
7%
(43 out (30 out (24 out (30 out (3 out (2 out
of 106) of 94) of 82) of 71) of 41) of 42)

See Trochev, supra note 12, at 169.
Id.
PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
Id.
See Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 7, at 373.
See infra Table 6.
PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.

17%
(8 out
of 46)

07/06/2017 10:17:34

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

7.70% 12.90% 11.40% 6.10% 6.30% 9.40% 2.48% 3.28% 12.00%
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Percentage
of Acquitted
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Number of 8%
Defendants
Tried by
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117. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: Procurator-General
Criticizes Everyone, supra note 84.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. V Khode Rassmotrenija Dela v Otnoshenii Z.Botabaeva Narushenij Zakonnosti
ne Dopuskalos’–B.Beknazarov [During the Hearing of the Case Against Z. Botabayev
Violations of Legality Were Not Allowed - B. Beknazarov], ZAKON (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.zakon.kz/4549313-v-khode-rassmotrenija-dela-v-otnoshenii.html [https://perma.cc/
852E-PP7Y].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Zaslugoi Advokata Nazvan Opravdatel’nyi Verdikt po Delu Nyne
Razyskivaemogo za Ubiistva v Ile-Alatauskom Natsparke Botabaeva [Acquittal Verdict of
Botabayev, Now Sought for Murder in Ili-Alatau National Park, Attributed to “the
Lawyer’s Merit”], MOSKOVSKII KOMSOMOLETS V KAZAKHSTANE (July 3, 2013), http://mkkz.kz/articles/2013/07/03/878758-zaslugoy-advokata-nazvan-opravdatelnyiyverdikt-po-delu-nyine-razyiskivaemogo-za-ubiystva-v-ilealatauskom-natsparkebotabaeva.html [https://perma.cc/DJ5D-WPMY].
124. B.Beknazarov Schitaet, Chto Prisiazhnye Zasedateli Mogut Byt’ Neob”ektivnymi
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Such a high acquittal rate in trials by jury is so unusual that in January
2013, then Procurator General Daulbayev had to ask President Nazarbayev in
public to intervene and order the conviction of Botabayev, who had been
acquitted by jury in Astana on multiple charges of murder. The appellate
court also confirmed his acquittal. 117 Botabayev was released and later
accused of terrorism. The Procurator General complained that judges did not
listen to the prosecution and had not been punished for that. 118 President
Nazarbayev immediately ordered the then Supreme Court Chairman Bektas
Beknazarov to hold a highly publicized trial (gromkoe razbiratelstvo). 119
Initially, judges resisted by saying that the acquittal was on the basis of the
jury verdict, and that the prosecutors failed to provide evidence of guilt. 120
Later, however, the judges quietly reopened the case and sent it back for
retrial by another jury, which promptly found Botabayev guilty in
abstentia. 121 Chairman Beknazarov underscored the legality of this reversal
of the acquittal by the fact that conviction was secured on the basis of the
directive of the President and the internal investigation. 122 Both grounds,
however, are absent from the Criminal Procedure Code. Three months later,
when this scandal calmed down, one judge of the Supreme Court publicly
attributed the initial acquittal in this case to the efforts of the defense attorney
who displayed “all of his public speaking talent” and provided “irrefutable”
evidence of innocence of the defendant—all of which persuaded jurors to
declare acquittal. 123
This episode clearly demonstrates how the balance of power is
maintained in the criminal justice system. Chairman Beknazarov stressed
that most jury verdicts are lawful and well-grounded—based on the review
by the appellate courts. Yet, in a clear nod to the security services, Chairman
Beknazarov proposed that the jurisdiction of the jury trials should no longer
include cases of extremism and terrorism because the accused could threaten
the jurors. 124 Indeed, in July 2013, these cases have been removed from the

39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 70 Side A

07/06/2017 10:17:34

TROCHEV FORMATTED

2017

Between Convictions and Reconciliations

6/28/2017 5:26 PM

131

jurisdiction of the jury trials, 125 which explains the drastic decline in the
number of jury trials in the last couple of years and the lower acquittal rate
between 2014 and 2016. 126 In fact, between 2009 and 2015, the jurisdiction
of jury trials has been changed several times, which led some observers to
conclude that the scope of their jurisdiction depends on the “mood and
caprices of legislators and law enforcement actors initiating and adopting the
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code.”127
Meanwhile, in the course of drafting the new Criminal Procedure Code,
some Procuracy chiefs tried to trim the jurisdiction of jury trials even further
by insisting that jury trials were useless in Kazakhstan, an effort that the
Supreme Court judges vocally opposed. 128 As Kairat Mami, the current
Chairman of the Supreme Court, argued in 2004, “jury trial should be judged
not only from the point of view of convenience of investigators, procurators,
attorneys and judges, but how well it protects rights and lawful interests of all
participants of criminal proceedings.” 129 The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code,
however, restricted the jurisdiction of the jury trials to only those crimes for
which the Criminal Code imposes life imprisonment or the death sentence.
In turn, in 2015, Chairman Mami managed to insert the expansion of the jury
trial on President Nazarbayev’s “100 Steps” program of reforming
Kazakhstan as Step #21: “Expansion of the sphere where jury trials are used.
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pri Rassmotrenii Del, Sviazannykh s Terrorizmom [B. Beknazarov Believes That Jurors
May Be Partial While Hearing Terrorism-Related Cases], ZAKON (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.zakon.kz/4549191-b.beknazarov-schitaet-chto-prisjazhnye.html [https://perma.cc/
Z8H3-ZMNK].
125. O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Konstitutsionnyj Zakon Respubliki
Kazakhstan i v Nekotorye Zakonodatel’nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam
Iskliuchenija Protivorechij, Probelov, Kollizii Mezhdu Normami Prava Razlichnykh
Zakonodatel’nykh Aktov i Norm, Sposobstvuiushchikh Soversheniiu Korruptsionnykh
Pravonarushenii [Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 121-V of July 3,
2013], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (July 5, 2013), http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/
Z1300000121 [https://perma.cc/6K9K-UCUV]; Slova Merkelja o Problemakh s
Kollegiiami Prisiazhnykh Oprovergli v Verkhovnom Sude Kazakhstana [Merkel’s Words
About Problems with Jury Panels Have Been Disconfirmed by Kazakhstan’s Supreme
Court], TENGRI NEWS (Nov. 8, 2013), https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/slovamerkelya-problemah-kollegiyami-prisyajnyih-oprovergli-245136/ [https://perma.cc/
CMR6-5QHL].
126. See supra Table 6.
127. Nikolai Kovalev, Reforms of Court Proceedings with Participation of Jurors in
Kazakhstan in the Previous Ten Years, in ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE LEGAL POLICY
RESEARCH CENTER ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES “EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION OF
COURTS WITH PARTICIPATION OF JURORS IN LIGHT OF THE PLAN OF NATION ‘100 STEPS’”, at
8 (Dec. 9, 2016) (on file with author).
128. Due to National Peculiarities of Kazakhstan a Reduction of Jury Trials is
Planned, TENGRI NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013), https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/iz-zanatsionalnyih-osobennostey-kazahstane-planiruyut-244632/ [https://perma.cc/F55EC7W8]; Merkel’s Words about Problems with Jury Panels Have Been Disconfirmed by
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court, supra note 125.
129. Kairat Mami, Institut Prisiazhnykh Zasedatelej: Problemy Teorii i Praktiki
Vnedreniia [Institution of Jurors: Problems of Theory and Practical Implementation], 2
VESTNIK KARAGANDA L. INST. MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. REPUBLIC KAZ. 3–19 (2004),
http://www.law.edu.ru/doc/document.asp?docid=1202568 [https://perma.cc/4KSZ7GFJ].
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Legislative definition of the category of criminal cases where the jury trial is
mandatory.” 130 In the wake of the President’s approval, in May 2015, the
Supreme Court Judge Abai Rakhmetulin enthusiastically announced: “We
propose to have mandatory jury trials in cases of all especially grave crimes,
except those against constitutional foundations of the state.” 131 However, the
October 2015 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code did not introduce
mandatory jury trials. Instead, these amendments slightly expanded the
jurisdiction of jury trials by including cases of aggravated kidnapping, human
trafficking and involvement of minors in crime to be tried by jury—crimes
that rarely enter the criminal justice system in Kazakhstan. 132 In January
2017, the senior official of the General Procuracy proposed to expand the jury
trials to all cases causing death. 133 These haphazard trajectories of jury trials
and disagreements among the top law-enforcement officials showcase the
dissatisfaction with the current ways of convicting and acquitting.
In Kazakhstan, acquittals, including acquittals by the jury, can be
reversed on appeal (as in the USSR)—an opportunity that the state
prosecutors pursue with vigor. This is because the appellate courts are much
more likely to reverse acquittals than convictions. In 2007, acquittals of
twenty-five defendants (8% of all acquittals) were overturned, in 2008, thirtysix (11%), and in 2009, nineteen defendants (5%).134 Compare this to the
0.5% of overturned sentences during these three years. 135 Then Procurator
General Daulbaev proudly reported that between 2010 and 2012, procurators
successfully appealed acquittals of seventy-one defendants. 136 In 2013,
acquittals of thirty-five defendants, or 8% of all acquittals that year, were
overturned on appeal. 137 Meanwhile, in 2014, acquittals of twenty-one
defendants (or of every other defendant) in cases of public prosecution have
been overturned. 138 Higher courts exonerate and acquit very few defendants
themselves: twenty-seven in 2008, fifteen in 2009, nineteen in 2010, forty in
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130. President Nazarbayev Unveils 100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional
Reforms, KAZINFORM (June 2, 2015), http://www.inform.kz/en/president-nazarbayevunveils-100-concrete-steps-to-implement-five-institutional-reforms_a2782614
[https://perma.cc/PG57-43BB].
131. Sferu Primeneniia Suda Prisiazhnykh Snova Rasshiriat v Kazakhstane [The
Sphere of Application of the Jury Trials Will Be Again Expanded in Kazakhstan], ZAKON
(May
12,
2015),
https://www.zakon.kz/4710677-sferu-primenenija-sudaprisjazhnykh.html [https://perma.cc/UL3L-LMP4].
132. Dmitrii Nurumov, On Further Democratization of Court Proceedings with
Participation of Jurors in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE
LEGAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES “EXPANSION OF
JURISDICTION OF COURTS WITH PARTICIPATION OF JURORS IN LIGHT OF THE PLAN OF NATION
‘100 STEPS’”, at 17 (Dec. 9, 2016) (on file with author).
133. Bulat Dembaev, Sud s Uchastiem Prisiazhnykh [Court with Participation of
Jurors], ZAKON (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.zakon.kz/4839666-sud-s-uchastiemprisjazhnykh-b.-dembaev.html [https://perma.cc/N44M-VRJ8].
134. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
135. Id.
136. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: Procurator-General
Criticizes Everyone, supra note 84.
137. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
138. Id.
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2011, forty-two in 2012, forty-six in 2013, and forty in 2014. 139 In 2015,
appellate courts reviewed cases of 6,810 persons in cases of public
prosecution and overturned sentences against 221 persons, acquitted twelve
persons, and overturned acquittals of ten persons. 140 Data in Table 7
demonstrates the reluctance of the appellate courts to confirm acquittals and
exonerations. As explained above, the Procuracy-initiated campaigns
resulted in the unusually high numbers of acquitted and exonerated in 2011
(357 in drug-related cases) and 2012 (156 in illegal business activity cases).
Table 7. Acquitted and Exonerated Defendants in the Cases of Public Prosecution in
Kazakhstan, 2011–2016 141
Year
Acquitted and Exonerated by
Trial Courts
Acquitted and Exonerated by
Trial and Appellate Courts

2011
680

2012
250

2013
81

2014
48

2015
88

2016
99

78

229

26

47

47

59
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139. Analysis of Facts of Violating of Legality by Courts of the Republic Related to the
Wrongful Convictions, BULLETIN SUP. CT. REPUBLIC KAZ., no. 5, 80–85 (2010). Figures
for 2010–2014 are author’s own calculations (the total number of acquitted persons by the
courts of appellate instance and of supervision, Nadzor, instance) based on the PRAVSTAT
[OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. It is possible that these numbers double count
the same defendants.
140. Id.
141. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. For a comparison, data
for 2015 and 2016 exclude criminal misdemeanors, introduced by the 2014 Criminal Code,
which previously have been included in the 2001 Code of Administrative Offenses.
142. Trochev, supra note 12, at 169; see Kishkembaev, supra note 92 (arguing that
judge may be disciplined or dismissed from the bench for several reversed sentences).
143. Toimatov, supra note 27.
144. Suleimenova, supra note 32.
145. Toimatov, supra note 27.
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There are negative repercussions on judges whilst deciding on acquittals.
Monthly monitoring of judges introduced in 2009 uses three overturned
sentences in a year as an indicator of failed judge’s performance that may
result in the dismissal from the bench. 142 The former Supreme Court Judge
Raif Toimatov explained that appellate courts conduct regular monitoring of
trial judges: if a judge has five overturned sentences in a year, he is
automatically dismissed from the job. 143 According to Toimatov, trial judges
seek advice of the appellate judges, who are likely to review the cases on the
appeal. And many judges believe that such consulting is legal. 144 Meanwhile,
appellate judges consult with the chair of their court if they consider
cancelling or changing the sentence: “Without his approval, not a single
reversal of the sentence or change of judgment happens. And nobody hides
this practice.” 145 As one judge put it, “the most important concern for a judge
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is that his decision not be overturned.” 146 Some judges view this fear of
reversal as a real threat to the individual independence of judges yet receive
little approval from their superiors. 147
Judges who dare to exonerate or acquit have to prove that the defendant
was not guilty instead of simply interpreting doubts in favor of the
defendants. 148 These judges also have to justify their decisions personally in
front of appellate courts and the Supreme Court. For example, in 2012, Judge
Aliya Zhumashova from the Pavlodar Province received a reprimand from
the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal for acquitting two persons in the case of a
stolen refrigerator. 149 She complained that appellate judges had told her not
to scrutinize the evidence of the prosecution and had insisted that good
relations with procurators were a key to her successful career on the bench.150
In her three-year career on the bench, she issued two acquittals and was
eventually dismissed from the bench in July 2013 for this “disciplinary”
offense. 151 The then Chairman of the Supreme Court confirmed her
complaints: “Unfortunately, there are judges who unconditionally trust the
prosecution.” 152 Yet none of judges faced any negative consequences
because procurators have amicable relations with judges. As former Supreme
Court Judge Toimatov, who had been dismissed from the bench for
exonerating two police officers in 1999, described, “it is no secret for
anybody that the decision in a case is agreed between the procurator and the
judge prior to trial, procurator can freely enter the judge chambers.” 153 Table
8 shows declining exoneration and acquittal rates in the criminal cases of
public prosecution among the provinces of Kazakhstan between 2011 and
2014, as well as a declining range of variation among provinces. This is in
contrast to a growing variation in approval of pre-trial detention, as shown on
Table 2 above. There is still a slight variation among provinces: obtaining an
acquittal in the Mangistau and Kyzyl-Orda Provinces is nearly impossible,
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Monitoringe i Ego Vliianii na Pravovoi Status Sudi’i [On Court Monitoring and Its
Influence on the Legal Status of a Judge], ZAKON (Nov. 20, 2013), http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31615230 [https://perma.cc/HE3W-WKHF].
148. Kishkembaev, supra note 92.
149. V Astane Sud’ia, Proiavivshaia Nezavisimyj Kharakter, Dala Press-Konferentsiju
v Svoju Zashchitu [In Astana, a Judge Who Displayed Independent Character Gave a
Press Conference in Her Own Defense], URALSKAIA GAZETA (Oct. 19, 2012), http://
www.uralskweek.kz/2012/10/19/v-astane-sudya-proyavivshaya-nezavisimyjxarakter-dala-press-konferenciyu-v-svoyu-zashhitu/ [https://perma.cc/TN23-2XGN];
see also Kazakhstan: Disciplinary Action Against Judge Zhumasheva Is an Attack on
Judicial Independence, INT’L COMM’N JURISTS (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.icj.org/
kazakhstan-disciplinary-action-against-judge-zhumasheva-is-an-attack-on-judicialindependence/ [https://perma.cc/L62D-L2FA].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Bektas Beknazarov, Trevozhit Tot Fakt, Chto Reviziia Osnovnoj Massy Del
Segodija Provoditsia na Urovne Verkhovnogo Suda [The Fact That the Supreme Court
Reviews Most Cases Is Alarming], ZAKON (July 7, 2011), https://www.zakon.kz/223151223151-bektas-beknazarov-trevozhit-tot-fakt.html [https://perma.cc/FLR5-WJDF].
153. Toimatov, supra note 27.
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while acquittal is rare yet possible in the neighboring Aktobe Province due
mostly to the jury trials. The caseload of courts does not seem to affect this
pattern. The entry in force in 2015 of the new Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedure Code appears to have resulted in higher numbers of sentenced
defendants in all but one province (Atyrau) and confirmed the decline of
acquittals and exonerations in criminal cases of public prosecutions. For
example, judges in the North Kazakhstan Province did not acquit and
exonerate anyone (and did not refuse a single pre-trial detention requests, as
shown in Table 2) tried in the criminal cases of public prosecution in 2015.
Meanwhile, judges in the city of Almaty and Karaganda Province acquitted
and exonerated more than a dozen persons tried for minor crimes in 2015.
The fact that this jump in acquittals and exonerations occurred only in two
places casts doubt on the thesis that the entry in force of the both Codes
changed the decision-making of judges. The trend of disappearing acquittals
and exonerations at the trial stage in most provinces over last four years is
similar to the trend in late socialism, but now it is a product of the decline of
jury trials discussed above, and the growth of procurator-made exonerations
at the pre-trial stage discussed below. In summary, if the late Soviet-era
judicial chiefs saw statistics on convictions in modern Kazakhstan, they
would approve internal dependence of judges on their superiors, award
bonuses to judges for the low number of acquittals and exonerations, and the
high rate of stability in sentences.
Table 8. The Ratio of Exonerated and Acquitted Defendants to Convicted Defendants
in the Cases of Public Prosecution in the Trial-Level Courts in Kazakhstan, 2011–
2015, by province, in the order of declining ratio in 2015 154
Province

2012

2013

2014

2015

Karaganda

70/2,142

Atyrau

12/1,002

29/1,823

4/2,022

2/1,755

16/2,247

7/799

1/1,109

4/1,027

6/1,005

Aktobe

19/1,175

25/969

15/1,115

2/1,111

8/1,701

Almaty City

63/2,452

1/2,135

3/2,756

2/2,778

14/3,115

Pavlodar
Almaty
Province
West
Kazakhstan
South
Kazakhstan
Kostanay

37/1,369

16/1,009

4/1,143

1/1,096

5/1,389

44/2,408

40/1,878

3/2,281

2/2,173

8/2,226

33/1,027

13/805

13/1,102

4/1,053

5/1,506

78/2,147

5/2,348

10/2,849

10/2,773

8/2,841

57/1,584

1/1,826

6/1,465

4/2,113

14/908

0/781

0/964

0/931

2/1,137

Akmola

65/1,532

8/1,162

7/1,215

3/973

2/1,441

Astana City

28/1,250

15/1,143

2/1,635

0/1,837

3/2,291

154. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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Zhambyl

51/1,790

1/1,663

3/1,635

1/1,551

2/1,688

Mangistau
East
Kazakhstan
North
Kazakhstan

25/1,102

8/780

1/887

2/815

1/1,1051

58/2,988

3/2,550

5/2,792

4/2,251

2/2,641

28/1,375

20/1,005

4/928

5/865

0/1,052
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155. Closing, dismissing, or terminating a criminal case mean the same throughout the
Article.
156. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
157. Id.
158. Alkon, supra note 2, at 66–67.
159. Id. at 85.
160. Batyrzhan Ashitov, Expansive Interpretation of Reconciliation with the Victim Is
Not Allowed, 22 VASHE PRAVO 289, 289 (June 2, 1999).
161. O Sudebnoi Praktike po Primeneniiu Stat’i 67 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Respubliki
Kazakhstan [Normative Edict of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan
No. 4 “On Judicial Practice of the Application of Article 67 of the Criminal Code
of the Republic of Kazakhstan”], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (July 21, 2001),
http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P01000004S_ [https://perma.cc/HQ4K-B8EW].
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V. Closing Cases Based on Reconciliation between the Victim and the
Accused—A Dramatic Expansion
Unlike the rarely used powers to exonerate or acquit, which Kazakhstani
judges had preserved from the Soviet-era, the power to close 155 cases based
on reconciliation between the victim and the accused is a post-Soviet
innovation. This power has been a topic of discussions among Soviet
criminal law experts since the early 1990s, yet it has not been codified in
actual criminal codes. This is due, in part, to the collapse of the Soviet Union
at the end of 1991. In Kazakhstan, closing criminal cases on the basis of
reconciliation became formally possible, when Article 67 of the newly
adopted 1997 Criminal Code vaguely stated: “A person who committed an
offence of a lesser gravity or medium gravity for the first time may be
released from criminal liability, if that person reconciled with the victim and
made good for the harm caused.” 156 In terms of paperwork, all that is required
for reconciliation is a short written statement from the victim that she or he
accepts reconciliation, wants the case to be closed, and has received
compensation for the crime. 157 In theory, closing cases on the grounds of
reconciliation centers on the interests of the victim: repairing the harm and
preventing re-victimization. 158 If the judge or the investigator agrees to
dismiss the case due to the reconciliation, the defendant’s record still reflects
the criminal charges. 159
Over objections of procurators, judges slowly but steadily expanded the
use of reconciliation and applied it to juvenile defendants and to cases of
criminal negligence, such as deaths caused by traffic accidents. 160 In 2001,
the Supreme Court confirmed this broadened application of reconciliation as
a basis for closing cases. 161 The December 2002 amendments to the Criminal
Code further expanded the application of reconciliation. The amended
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wording of Article 67 required closing criminal cases on these grounds of
crimes of lesser gravity (such as theft and joyriding) committed multiple
times and of crimes of medium gravity (such as robbery), committed for the
first time and without the grave harm to health or death of the victim. It also
permitted closing criminal cases for repeated crimes of medium gravity:
1. A person who committed an offence of a lesser gravity or for the first time
committed an offense of medium gravity, which did not cause death or grievous
harm to an individual’s health, shall be released from criminal liability, if that
person reconciled with the victim and made good for the harm caused.
2. A person who committed a medium gravity offence may be released from
criminal liability if he reconciled with the victim or the applicant and made good
for the harm caused to the victim or the applicant. 162

As Table 8 shows, judges enthusiastically used this expansion of
reconciliation and tripled the proportion of criminal cases closed on this basis
in 2003. Between 2000 and 2005, Kazakhstani courts most often dismissed
reconciled cases involving offenses of larceny, robbery, fraud, rape, and
reckless driving. 163 Over objections of procurators, Kazakhstani judicial
chiefs actively lobbied for expanding the use of reconciliation. 164 In 2005,
the share of cases closed on the basis of reconciliation constituted 95.5% of
all criminal cases closed by judges on non-rehabilitative grounds. 165 At the
end of 2009, when judges closed every third criminal case on this basis (see
Table 9), the then Chairman of the Supreme Court, Musabek Alimbekov,
argued that wider use of out-of-trial reconciliation would allow the courts
“slowly to move away from mandatory punitive principles” of administering
criminal justice and “to compensate victim for the damagesthen justice will
be done.” 166 As a result of these lobbying efforts to both humanize and reduce
the prison population, Article 67 was further amended in 2010 and 2011 with
the addition of two new sections:

162. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
163. Alkon, supra note 2, at 87.
164. D. Dzhanuzakov, Slaboe Zveno. Nechetkaia Pozitsiia Verkhovnogo suda RK v
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Nekotorykh Voprosakh Igraet na Ruku Prestupnikam [Weak Link. Unclear Position of the
RK Supreme Court on Some Issues Helps Criminals], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Jan. 9,
2002), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1027181 [https://perma.cc/9M62D9SV].
165. Arstan Akhpanov & Sergei Pen, Posrednichestvo Kak Instrument Pravosudiia
[Mediation as an Instrument of Justice], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Dec. 27, 2006),
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30082780 [https://perma.cc/4JWN-XBTP].
166. The Head of the SC RK Calls for the Majority of Disputes to Be Resolved on the
Basis of the out of Court Reconciliation of the Parties, ZAKON (Nov. 5, 2009),
https://www.zakon.kz/152533-152533-glava-vs-rk-ratuet-za-to-chtoby.html [https://
perma.cc/7785-FUWR].

39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 73 Side A

3. A minor who for the first time committed a grave offence which did not cause
death or serious harm to a person’s health may be released from the criminal
liability by a court if that person reconciled with the victim and made good for the
harm caused to the victim. At the same time, compulsory education measures
stipulated by Article 82 of this Code shall be applied upon a given minor.
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4. If an offence harms the legally protected interests of the public and the state, a
person specified in the first and the second parts of this Article may be released
from criminal liability if he sincerely repents and makes amends for the harm caused
to the protected interests of the public or the state. The provisions of this Article
shall not apply to persons who have committed crimes of corruption. 167
Table 9. Criminal Cases Resolved by Reconciliation after Charges Filed in Court 168
Year

Cases Heard

Cases Resolved by
Reconciliation

Percentage of Cases
Resolved by
Reconciliation after
Charges Filed in Court

2000

5%

2001

6%

2002

8%

2003

22%

2004

25%

2005

22%

47,246

15,097

32%

2009

48,358

15,334

32%

2010

46,844

18,701

39%

2011

40,844

19,764

48%
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RECONCILIATION” (IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS)], http://kazmediation.kz/files/
2013/docs/2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF2F-63GZ]; Alkon, supra note 2.
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167. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
168. VERKHOVNYI SUD RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN GENERAL’NAIA PROKURATURA
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2012

36,029

17,001

47%

2013

47,466

19,392

41%

169. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
170. See, e.g., Samples of Claims and Other Court Appeals, URAL CITY CT.
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W. KAZ. PROVINCE, http://zko.sud.kz/rus/sub/zkogor/obrazcy-iskovyh-zayavlenii-idrugih-obrashcheniy-v-sud [https://perma.cc/33L9-J3GG] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
171. See infra Section III.
172. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
173. Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp Asanov, supra note 35.
174. Na Nameki Sud’i o Primirenii Pozhalovalis’ Rodnye Pogibshego pod Kolesami
Avto eks-Pomoshchnika Prokurora v Astane [Relatives of the Deceased under the Wheels
of Car of Ex-Assistant Procurator in Astana Complained against the Judge’s Hints about
Reconciliation], MATRITCA (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.matritca.kz/news/9064-nanameki-sudi-o-primirenii-pozhalovalis-rodnye-pogibshego-pod-kolesami-avto-ekspomoschnika-prokurora-v-astane.html [https://perma.cc/9XRY-MZE6].
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Again, these amendments to the Criminal Code made a difference in
judicial decision-making. As Table 8 shows, judges closed about 18,000
cases annually or every other criminal case based on reconciliation in 2011
and 2013. Most of these cases were thefts and non-violent robberies—crimes
of medium gravity, which meant that judges had exercised discretion in
deciding whether to close the case or continue the trial. 169 Some courts even
have templates of reconciliation forms posted on their websites. 170
As Table 10 shows, until 2013, judges closed about 70% of all reconciled
cases while investigators closed the remaining 30%. In 2013, however, this
proportion diametrically reversed when the Procuracy chiefs began insisting
on registration of all criminal cases while reducing the prison population and
counting the number of closed cases to evaluate the performance of
prosecutors. 171 Judicial chiefs also gave a clear signal that prosecutorial
discretion was more important than the discretion of judges by warning that
reduction of the prison population could be achieved only when the lawenforcement agencies would limit the number of criminal cases sent to
overloaded courts. 172 This reversal shows that bureaucratic incentives drive
the decision-making of law-enforcement officials on the ground and that
investigators take an active part in convincing the victim and the accused to
reconcile. Convincing may take the form of sharing the spoils of
compensation with the victim or pressuring the victim to reconcile. The then
Deputy Prosecutor-General, Zhakyp Asanov, admitted that problems with
law-enforcement officials pressuring the victims and the defendants to
reconcile exist. 173 Media reports indicate that judges also pressure victims to
reconcile with the defendants, especially when defendants are governmental
officials or local VIPs, for whom conviction would mean the end of their
careers. 174 Paradoxically, pressure on the victim to reconcile may bring
perverse adversariality into the inquisitorial criminal proceedings: law-
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enforcement officials work together with the defendant to force the victim to
agree to reconciliation. In 2014, procurators closed cases of 62,603
defendants and sent to court criminal cases against 44,479 defendants. 175 The
entry in force of Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code did not change
this proportion much: in 2015 procurators closed cases of 54,032 defendants
and sent 32,796 to court; in 2016, the numbers were 60,393 and 33,461
respectively. 176
Table 10. Closing Reconciled Cases at the Pre-trial and Trial Stages of the Criminal
Process 177

Closed
Reconciled
Cases at the
Pre-trial Stage
%

Closed
Reconciled
Cases, Total

Closed Reconciled
Cases by Judges
at the Trial Stage
%

2008

21,412

6,315

30%

15,097

70%

2009

21,201

5,867

27%

15,334

73%

2010

23,948

5,247

22%

18,701

78%

2011

27,197

7,433

27%

19,764

73%

2012

27,038

10,037

37%

17,001

63%

2013

59,392

40,000

67%

19,392

33%

What explains the attractiveness of reconciliation procedures? Alkon,
who studied the this practice extensively on the basis of official statistics and
interviews with the law-enforcement officials in the mid-2000s, argues that
corruption and reducing caseloads and decreasing the responsibility of the
criminal justice professionals (such as detectives, investigators, procurators,
and judges) to fulfil job performance indicators serve as the prime motivators
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175. Data for 2015 and 2016 exclude defendants convicted of criminal misdemeanors.
PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
176. Id.
177. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168; Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp
Asanov, supra note 35.
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Alkon, supra note 2, at 103.
Id.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168; Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
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behind the increased use of reconciliation procedures.178 Reducing caseloads
is a strong motivator for the criminal justice system in any country. Judges
spend much less time writing dismissal of the case than writing a guilty
sentence. Meanwhile, the decreasing responsibility is a sign of the legacy of
late socialism: judges continue to cover-up the shoddy work of the state
prosecution. The prosecution still secures a conviction since the defendant
receives a criminal record, albeit without a court sentence. Until 2013,
investigators and procurators clearly shirked responsibility for closing cases
by sending such cases to trial and hoping to secure convictions based on
sloppy investigation, 179 and because they were rewarded for a higher number
of cases sent to courts, they misled the defendants and victims that
reconciliation could only be done in the cases of private prosecution or was
to be done only by judges. 180 Table 11 demonstrates that judges in different
provinces vary greatly in terms of closing cases on this basis, as procurators
do not seem to insist on convictions that carry the risk of expanding the prison
population—a process that the country’s leadership discourages. This wide
inter-provincial variation is in stark contrast with the lack of variation in
acquitting or refusing to detain discussed above. This variation exists because
of different patterns of relationships among the criminal justice professionals
on the ground who exercise discretion without the real risk of appellate
review and monitoring from above. 181 As shown in Table 11, there is no
direct relationship between the caseload and frequency of reconciliation,
though courts with the lightest caseloads on the bottom of Table 11 tend to
have the lowest share of closed cases. Until 2015, courts in the top four rows
of the Table 11 used to close every other criminal case through reconciliation
even though procurators have been sending fewer cases to courts. Judges in
the large urban centers like Almaty and Astana, where defendants and victims
are less likely to know each other, see higher caseloads and appear to close
more cases via reconciliation now than they did four years ago. Comparisons
between 2014 and 2015 show that the new Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedure Code seem to have led to the decline in reconciled criminal cases
in absolute numbers and in the proportion of all cases handled for all
provinces except Almaty Province, and the cities of Almaty and Astana.
Finally, province-level data in Table 2 on pre-trial detentions, Table 8 on
exonerations and acquittals, and Table 11 on reconciliations show that courts
in the same province may perform differently in processing these three
categories of judicial business. Principles of legality, fairness and humanism
do not seem to drive judges in processing criminal cases.
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Table 11. Criminal Cases of Public Prosecution Closed by Judges via Reconciliation
in 2011–2015, by Province, in the Order of Declining Share of Closed Cases
(Percentage of All Criminal Cases Handled) in 2015 182
Province

2012

2013

770 (26%)

575 (23%)

1,306 (36%)

1,458 (40%) 1,487 (39%)

Aktobe

1,630 (59%)

988 (50%)

1,358 (56%)

1,110 (51%)

996 (38%)

Pavlodar

1,170 (45%)

1,283 (49%)

1,294 (49%)

1,220 (50%)

860 (36%)

948 (53%)

765 (50%)

945 (50%)

739 (46%)

547 (34%)

Akmola

1,805 (53%)

1,336 (49%)

1,211 (50%)

681 (43%)

731 (33%)

Karaganda

2,082 (50%)

1,674 (46%)

2,004 (49%)

1,547 (48%) 1,068 (33%)

South
Kazakhstan

1,148 (34%)

1,312 (35%)

1,622 (37%)

2,518 (46%) 1,782 (31%)

Almaty City

676 (24%)

494 (19%)

1,287 (33%)

1,351 (33%) 1,372 (30%)

North
Kazakhstan

1,561 (55%)

1,357 (55%)

891 (51%)

389 (34%)

408 (28%)

Kostanay

2,007 (51%)

1,876 (50%)

2,271 (56%)

1,605 (54%)

764 (27%)

Astana City

363 (23%)

454 (25%)

652 (28%)

674 (26%)

669 (21%)

West
Kazakhstan

510 (61%)

450 (33%)

482 (32%)

603 (38%)

346 (19%)

Mangistau

360 (28%)

346 (35%)

446 (37%)

336 (32%)

225 (19%)

3,152 (49%)

2,505 (46%)

1,454 (38%)

618 (19%)

Almaty Province

Kyzyl-Orda

2011

East Kazakhstan 3,408 (52%)

2014

2015

Atyrau

559 (72%)

375 (32%)

555 (35%)

438 (29%)

151 (12%)

Zhambyl

496 (33%)

413 (20%)

392 (21%)

248 (15%)

101 (6%)
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182. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
183. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
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From the point of view of the defendant, reconciliation is the best
opportunity to avoid being sentenced. This is in the context that there is a high
probability of serving a real prison sentence and a miniscule chance of being
exonerated and acquitted. Indeed, avoiding a sentence is the main priority for
defendants because the risk of imprisonment is high. Between 2006 and
2014, the share of prison sentences among all sentences has been consistently
high even though it has gradually declined from 52% to 37%. 183 For victims,
reconciliation may be the only viable option to recover any kind of
compensation, which usually takes monetary form. What goes on during
negotiations between the accused and the victim is not very well known, but
it is clear that the bargaining power is determined by the negotiation skills of
the parties and the social status of the offender. For example, when a drunken
son of the member of Kazakhstani Parliament shot a security guard in Astana
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in 2007, the criminal case against him was closed through reconciliation after
his father paid for the medical treatment and presented a one-bedroom
apartment to the victim. 184
Alkon also argues that investigators, who preserved the Soviet-era
monopoly on recognizing someone as a victim of crime, and judges are
heavily involved in this process and receive kickbacks from the accused for
persuading the victim to reconcile. 185 For example, investigators and
procurators could lessen criminal charges to medium gravity, thus, making
the Article 67 of the Criminal Code applicable. Or they could bring charges
under the Code of Administrative Offenses, thus, removing the case from the
criminal justice system altogether. 186 Akhpanov and Pen note that
investigators and inquiry officials often
serve as intermediaries between the victim and the suspect, persuade[,] and, in some
cases, openly blackmail the suspect (defendant) to pay a certain sum to the victim
as compensation for harm caused by crime. The investigator or inquiry official prenegotiates with the victim that part of the amount paid will be transferred to the
investigator as a reward for mediation and assistance. 187

1) political incentives of conducting a “zero tolerance” criminal justice system, yet
reducing prison population;
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184. Aydar Yakubov, Son of Senator Oralbay Abdyykarimov Stand Trial for
“Hooliganism”, AZZATYQ (Mar. 4, 2010), http://rus.azattyq.org/a/Kairat_
Abdykarimov_Oralbai_Abdykarimov/1973626.html [https://perma.cc/4E5D-WQWE].
185. Alkon, supra note 2, at 103.
186. Id.
187. Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
188. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67, as amended on April 23, 2014 by
the Law # 200-V.
189. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. Data for 2015 and 2016
exclude those convicted of criminal misdemeanors.
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These tricks have been successfully, yet controversially, used by local
VIPs and their family members in high-profile traffic accidents involving
deaths. The public controversy surrounding these cases eventually resulted
in the April 2014 amendments to Article 67 of the Criminal Code that banned
reconciliation as a basis for closing cases in which criminal negligence
resulted in the death of one or more persons. 188 In practice, however, given
that eight out of ten convicted persons are jobless (80% in 2014, 82% in 2015,
and 83% in 2016), working-age adults, it is less likely that the defendants
have sufficient wealth to offer attractive bribes to law-enforcement
officials. 189 More likely, the accused themselves have strong incentives to
bargain with the victims regardless of involvement of any law-enforcement
official.
In short, the new post-Soviet criminal procedure of closing criminal
cases based on reconciliation works in Kazakhstan because it aligns well with
three types of demands and incentives:
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2) bureaucratic incentives for law-enforcement officials and judges (lighter
workload and less responsibility for the same output, without disrupting the
working relationship among criminal justice professionals); and
3) demands for broader autonomy from the defendant (who does not want to be
sentenced) and the victim of crime (who prefers actual and quick compensation for
the harm to the punishment of the defendant).

More generally, this is a pragmatic way for the ruling regime to empower
private actors to settle their disputes in the shadow of the criminal justice
system. As most criminal cases are closed through reconciliation, either by
judges or procurators in Kazakhstan, defendants face a choice between being
sentenced or released based on reconciliation with the victim, with higher
social status and affluence helping certain defendants avoid being sentenced.
Meanwhile, judges process, and most likely approve, the decisions of
procurators (when reconciliation was not possible) and the monetary bargains
when defendants and the victims achieve reconciliation.

1) in the pre-trial phase when they get approval for detentions in 9.5 out of 10 cases;
2) in criminal trials when they succeed in avoiding acquittals and exonerations; and
3) in appellate proceedings when they have their appeals against denied detentions,
lenient sentences, or acquittals confirmed at a much higher success rate than defense
attorneys.

190. See, e.g., Suleimenova, supra note 32.
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The Soviet-era treatment of acquittals as failures of state prosecutors and
trial-level judges drives the unwillingness of judges to acquit because judges
know that acquittals have a much higher chance of being overturned. The
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Conclusion
The critics of the Kazakhstani criminal justice system usually point out
the pliancy, corruption, and accusatorial bias of judges.190 However, as this
Article shows, a majority of criminal cases do not reach judges, and when the
remaining cases get to the judge’s docket, there is a 50% chance of the case
being terminated rather than decided on the merits and resulting in conviction.
Prosecutors decide the fate of the majority of criminal cases as prepared by
detectives and investigators, and they increasingly close cases on the basis of
reconciliation between defendants and victims, often working on the side of
the defendants. Thus, any serious criminal justice investigation is influenced
by the discretion of detectives, investigators, prosecutors, and judges. It is
this exercise of discretion that allowed Kazakhstan to reduce prison
population in parallel with the more recent drives for the total registration of
crimes and a zero tolerance approach to combating crime. However,
implementing the right to a fair trial and cultivating judicial independence—
requirements of the Constitution of Kazakhstan—are arduous tasks because
they disrupt existing power relationships among criminal justice system
professionals. In administering criminal justice, Kazakhstani judges remain
junior partners to law-enforcement agencies, which dominate:
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Soviet-era indicator of “stability of sentences” is still one of the most
important job performance indicators for a judge. Add to this the ability of
the law-enforcement agencies to allege that recalcitrant judges are selling
their decisions and to influence judicial careers even where judges have life
tenure. Judges are strongly expected both to detain and to convict, yet are
unable to convince the public that bails, house arrests, and acquittals are good
for society. The strength of the Soviet-era informal judge-procurator
relationship, as shown by the surprisingly stable detention and acquittal rates,
lies in the blend of trust, mutual understanding, and fellowship between
judges and law-enforcement officials, who exert occasional pressure against
recalcitrant judges, or judges who dare to disagree with the wishes of
prosecutors. In Kazakhstan, this close relationship is preserved by the old
guard: appellate judges who made their careers by deferring to the Procuracy
in Soviet times. This is why the jurisdiction of jury trials, which produce an
unusually high acquittal rate, is slowly shrinking. And this is why judges
appear to show no accusatorial bias (they acquit more than convict) in cases
of private prosecution where procurators do not participate.
Legal innovations, like closing criminal cases of public prosecution
based on reconciliation with the victim of crime, take root because they are
well-suited to both the incentives of the criminal justice system and the
demands of private actors who are involved in criminal proceedings. On the
one hand, reconciliation makes the job of investigators, prosecutors, and
judges easier, since they secure a criminal record for the defendant—the most
preferred outcome for these officials at the least cost (and a potential for bribe
from the defendant) and the lowest risk of reversal. On the other hand, it
affords much more autonomy to the defendant (who is guaranteed a guilty
sentence) and the victim in deciding the outcome of the prosecution. This is
a stark contrast to the lack of reconciliation in criminal cases of private
prosecution, where the outcome of a trial tends to favor the defendants, who,
therefore, have no incentive to reconcile. Kazakhstan’s experience shows
that legacies determine that rule-of-law innovations are likely to take root in
the criminal justice system so long as they reinforce or do not hurt the
amicable relationship between judges and prosecutors.
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